1033: Born in Aosta (an ancient Roman town, now in Italy)

1059: Arrived at Bec (near Rouen in France)

1060: Becomes a monk at Bec

1063: Becomes prior at Bec

1078: Elected abbot at Bec

1093: Invested with archbishopric of Canterbury

1109: Death

1060-3 De Grammatico (Anselm's only secular work; a commentary on Aristotle's Categories, a logic textbook)

-hiatus period-

1070-5 Prayers and Meditations

1075-6 Monologion

1077-8 Proslogion

1095-8 Cur deus homo?

1. Lanfrank (Prior and Abbot at Bec, and Master of school at Bec)

2. Bible (especially the Psalms)

3. Augustine (introspection and divine illumination)

4. Aristotle and Boethius (probably via Lanfrank)

5. Gilbert Crispin (archbishop at Canterbury)

1. Lanfrank: Teacher and Disputer

a. Famed teacher of liberal arts (prior to 1040)

b. Lanfrank's excellence in grammar, rhetoric, and logic put the Benedictine monastery at Bec on the intellectual map from 1040/2 onwards. The monastery and external school at Bec rose to prominence under Lanfrank (e.g., many new pupils, financial improvements, library extended) who served as both prior (and later abbot) of the abbey and master of the Bec school.

c. Lanfrank's thought and intellectual contributions began with liberal arts (the sciences of the trivium and quadrivium), moved to textual problems encountered in Scripture (e.g., grammatical, logical, and rhetorical problems in Paul's letters) and finally to theological matters (e.g., the Eucharist controversy of 1059). Trivium: grammar, rhetoric, and logic. Quadrivium: arithmetic, music, geometry, and astronomy.

d. Produced the first thorough commentary on the words, sentences, and forms of argument used by St. Paul.

e. Lanfrank's method involves both (I) the application of dialectic to biblical text and (ii) the citation of authorities (e.g., selections from Patristic texts). This method would become standard by the end of the century.

f. Lanfrank was a key participant in the Eucharist controversy of 1059, in which theologians debated the meaning of the real presence of Christ in the host. (see below)

2. Bible

Although much of Anselm's reasoning about God takes place apart from the authority of Scripture (by Anselm's own admission), the influence of Scripture, especially the Psalms is evident throughout. This is notably the case in all his prayers and meditations which are replete with biblical theology.

3. Augustine

Anselm explicitly acknowledges his dependence on Augustine at the beginning of the Monologion.

The introspectivism of Augustine shows itself everywhere in Anselm, though with one difference: Anselm's introspection leads to a greater degree of self-abasement and humiliation.

Augustine was also Anselm's main source for the neo-Platonism which runs throughout his works. The characteristics of neo-Platonism include: (I) hierarchical conception of the world revealing degrees of perfection and (ii) exemplarism according to which all things which exist derive their being and perfection by way of participation in a divine ideal or archetype (according to which God creates the world). Note, though, that other characteristics of neo-Platonism (found in other neo-platonists such as John Scotus Eriugena) are not exploited by Anselm: emanationism, the ineffability of God, and the radical contrast between the spiritual and physical. His neo-Platonism is tempered. He is a neo-platonist in a broad and general sense.

4. Aristotle and Boethius

The influence of Boethius and through Boethius Aristotle contributes to the "logical" or "rationalist" dimension to Anselm which separates him from St. Augustine and generates his distinctive style more than the influence of neo-Platonism. The Aristotelian-Boethian influence probably comes via Lanfrank, especially from the books his provided for Anselm at Bec, even though this dialectical influence troubled Lanfrank.

5. Gilbert Crispin

The friend of Anselm and archbishop of Canterbury before Anselm took that position in 1093.

From Crispin Anselm was probably influenced to take on the question of why God became man and to present his argument in dialogue form. (see below under Cur Deus Homo?)

1. The rise of a new system of theological inquiry characterized by (a) attempts at reconciling (apparent?) contradictions in past theological literature and (b) the refining of "method" into rigorous logical analysis; sharpening the edge to theological discussion.

2. As a consequence of 1., the rise of opposing schools of thought; conflict becomes essential to theological discourse. Citation of authorities that conflict, resolution sought.

3. Closely related to 1. and 2. is the conflict between the dialecticians and nondialecticians. The 11th century saw the rise of two distinct approaches to theology, one that saw theology as basically a matter of textual commentary on Scripture (nondialecticians) and those who wanted to extend theological method to include the rational analysis and systematic organization of the data of Scripture. [Peter Damian, for instance, warns against the use of syllogism, art of speech, and inferences. These are not to set constraints on our thought about the nature and activity of God.]

4. Eucharist controversy (1059) involving the meaning of the real presence of Christ in the host. Key disputants: Lanfrank and Berengar (the dialectician). Lanfrank sought to employ, howbeit in a less than conspicuous fashion, Aristotelian concepts to explain the real presence of Christ. According to Lanfrank, the real presence was substantial (in the Aristotelian sense!). The substance of Christ's body replaces the invisible substance of the bread, though by divine mercy, the accidents (e.g., size, shape, taste, etc) of the bread remain the same. Berengar simply thought of the presence as real but not substantial.

4. Jews in England argued that the transcendence of God (and His honor and dignity) was compromised by the Christian doctrine of the incarnation and resurrection.

E. Methodology and Characteristics of Anselm's writings 

Origin:

Anselm's written work grows out of his religious experience as a monk. The context is that of the monastic community.

Two Aims of Introspection:

Horror of Self and Knowledge of God

Two Characteristics of Introspection:

Intensity of feeling and thought

Clarity of thought and expression

Anselm uses debate to sharpen conclusions he reaches by nondialectical investigation, not to reach the conclusions. Precision, argument, and definition enter in after contemplation has resulted in "vision" or clarity of thought. Anselm's writings do not exhibit the typical pro et contra form of scholastic method. Even Anselm's dialogues are between "friends" and hence to not pose any serious division of thought or position (except de grammatico, his first written work). Lanfrank had difficulties with this method because of its avoidance of citing authorities (who were regarded as the proper guides for theological enquiry).

A. Purpose:

To discover things about the divine being without any appeal to scripture (auctoritate scripturae penitus nihil in ea persuaderetur) and to reach conclusions from the necessity of reasons (rationis necessitas).

(I) exemplum meditandi de ratione fidei (an example of meditating about the grounds of faith) and then (ii) monoloquium

A philosophical "meditation" on the Divine being based. The introspective character of Anselm's earlier writings is extended to allow a movement from self-knowledge (and contempt for self) and knowledge of external reality to "general essences" in which all things have their being - a process whereby the mind, clouded by the darkness of sin, is able to rise toward God (even if not achieved in the present life). The investigation (indagatio, investigation of a difficult or troublesome case) takes place without any appeal to "authorities" (biblical or theological), resting only on the model of St. Augustine (to whom Anselm refers at the beginning of the treatise).

The Monologion marks a turning point in the development of Anselm's thought. Introspection moves to a higher level.

1. CHAPTERS 1-27: determinate being (or nature) of God abstractly considered - the one supreme principle.

[greatest of all beings, has existence through itself, all other things are derived from it, creation as instantiation of divine exemplars, what can be said about the divine substance, simplicity of divine substance, eternality (atemporality), omnipresence, immutability]

[the Spirit, the Word, the Father, common and unique properties of the persons, love in the Godhead, ineffability of Triune God]

[the ineffable must be believed, truth about the ineffable may be reached by the human mind, the end of created beings - love of God, happy and miserable souls, immortality, faith]

Anselm's Monologion lacks quotations of (and references to) both Scripture and earlier theological authorities - a very significant departure from the method of the times. Although the text contains biblical and Augustinian marks, they are not red-flagged and must be uncovered by the reader. They are the background, not the act. Lanfrank found the treatise objectionable because of this lack of citation of and dialectical engagement with theological authorities.

Even the introspective aspect to the Monologion presents a variation on the normal practice of meditation. It was common for meditation to have its origin in the reading of an authoritative text. For Anselm, meditation is loosed from text and located in the mind itself, in sense impressions, self-knowledge, and the mind's own concepts.

1. Purpose: to meditate on the divine being as a supplement to the meditation of the Monologion but with a single argument (unum argumentum) for the divine being.

2. Titles: fides quaerens intellectum ("faith seeking understanding") and then Proslogion ("An Allocution").

3. General Character of Text:

To show by meditative reason that God is and is what Faith proclaims him to be ("quia es sicut credimus, et hoc es quod credimus." The attributes of goodness, truth, and justice must cohere as necessary attributes of a single being who cannot be thought of as nonexistent.

4. Outline of Text:

chapters 1-4: argument for the existence of God

chapters 5-13: argument for the determinate being or nature of God

Follows the Aristotelian distinction between an est (existence of a thing) and quid est (essence of a thing).

5. Differs from Monologion by its noticeable lack of dependence (except in influence or form) on Augustine. Avoids all references to source - very nonscholastic!

Contrary to popular presentation (originating with Aquinas), Anselm does not treat the existence of God as self-evident, as a proposition the negation of which is obviously or immediately seen to be self-contradictory. He presents an argument for the existence of God.

[DEF] God = df. that than which none greater can be conceived.

(cf. Seneca)

Therefore,

Argument is valid. (instance of modus ponens)

But is it sound?

Is Premise (B) true?

The truth of premise B depends in part on the coherence of Anselm's definition of God as "that than which none greater can be conceived."

But, the coherence of Anselm's concept of God requires an absolute comparison of things, a sense in which something is "absolutely speaking" greater than something else. We are accustomed to comparing things as being greater than other things in particular aspects, but not per se.

Anselm's notion of "greatness" should be read within the context of his neo-Platonic metaphysics. The greater is the more perfect, or that which possesses a higher degree of existence in absolute terms. "That than which none greater can be conceived" is a maximally perfect being, a being who possesses the greatest array of compossible great-making properties. (Note Anselm does not say, a being "greater than all" (maius omnibus).

The existence of such a being in reality (in re) is logically possible. No contradiction is involved in postulating such a being.

The "we" includes both theists and (some) atheists. Roughly, anyone who understands by "God", that than which none greater can be conceived. The person excluded from this argument is what we might call a logical atheist, one who holds that a maximally perfect being is incoherent or meaningless. Such a person would deny that we can conceive of such a being. Anselm is targeting factual atheists, those who understand what it is for there to be a God but who deny such a being actually exists.

Anselm's argument plays on a crucial distinction between esse in intellectu and esse in re, where the former is understood as a thing's being thinkable or logically possible and the latter being the thing's actual existence or instantiation. The two are not the same, for Anselm says, "It is one thing for any object to be in the understanding, and another to understand that the object exists."

As for God, God's existence in intellectu follows from the fact that there are individuals who can conceive of a maximally perfect being (which is identified as God). In other words, the word God has a definite description that is understood. But is God exists in intellectu, then he can be conceived of as existing in re - His existence in re is logically possible. As Charlesworth says: "We know what it would be like for that thing to exist, but we don't know whether it actually exists or not" (St. Anselm's Proslogion, p. 63).

Let's restate the argument, then, as:

(A*) If God exists in intellectu, then God exists in re.

(B*) God exists in intellectu.

therefore,

(C*) God exists in re.

Is (A*) true?

How can we move from mental to extra-mental existence?

Anselm thinks that we can show that (1) is true by way of an argumentum reductio ad absurdum. To establish a proposition, we assume its negation and show that it leads to a contradiction. In this case, the fool, when he hears of "a being than which nothing greater can be conceived understands what he hears, and what he understands is in his understanding, although he does not understand it to exist." But the fool says "there is no God."

Anselm's objective is to show that the fool's assertion is self-contradictory.

Anselm's argument rests on three premises:

The fool may be understood to say:

We may think of Anselm's argument in chapter two of the Proslogion as an argumentum reductio ad absurdum derived from (4) and the Anselmian premises (in italics).

Since (7) is self-contradictory, the assumption (4) from which the contradiction was deduced is false. It is not the case that God exists in intellectu and not in re. Therefore, God exists in both the understanding and in reality. It follows (by simplification) that God exists in reality. Thus, if a person can conceive of a being than Whom none greater exists, God exists. Such a being can be conceived. Therefore, God exists.

Having derived the existence of God, Anselm begins chapter 3 by saying, "And it [God] assuredly exists so truly, that it cannot be conceived not to exist." As it is one thing to exist in the understanding and quite another to exist in reality, so it one thing for a thing to be that which can be thought to not exist and another to be a thing which cannot be thought not to exist. Although Anselm was emphatic that in the Proslogion he intended to give unum argumentum, chapter 3 presents what has generally been conceded to be a different version of the ontological argument.

In chapter 3, though Anselm functions with the same definition of God, instead of the premise "existence in re is greater than existence in intellectu alone," Anselm substitutes "what cannot be thought not to exist is greater than what can be thought not to exist." This has been taken to be an argument that contrasts necessary and contingent existence. The argument of chapter 2 says nothing of the mode of God's existence. Simply concluding that God actually exists is compatible with God existing contingently. But it is logically possible to conceive of a being who cannot be conceived not to exist (a necessary being). Since such a being is greater than one who can be thought not to exist (a contingent being), if God can be thought to not exist, he would not be a being than which nothing greater can be conceived. Again, contradiction follows.

Although Anselm does not (as he has been often accused of) define God as necessary being and deduce his existence from a mere consideration of the definition (as if "God exists" were an analytic proposition), it would seem that a more plausible reading reveals Anselm inferring that God's existence is necessary from the notion of degrees of perfection. Since God is the being than whom none greater can be conceived and a being who exists necessarily is greater than a being who exists contingently, God exists necessarily. It is the latter premise, as something independent of the definition of God, which is required to derive the necessity of God's existence. And the necessity of God's existence proves eo ipso his actual existence, for if it is possible that that which cannot not be can be, then it must be. God's possible existence provides a basis for his actual existence.

The monk Gaunilo, one of Anselm's contemporaries, found several flaws in Anselm's argument. Gaunilo's criticisms focus, as nearly all subsequent ones do, on the move from God's existence being conceived of in the mind to His extra-mental existence. Anselm and Gaunilo both agree that there is a distinction between X in re and X in intellectu. Both also recognize that there are false things as well as true things in the mind, so that it is often the case that X is not in re but X is in intellectu. Inasmuch as Anselm agrees with this, there would seem to be a need for establishing how it is that with respect to this one object, God, His being merely conceived of somehow entails that He actually exists. Otherwise, it remains impossible to distinguish between X in re and X in intellectu--one of Anselm's own premises.

Gaunilo also provides what he apparently takes as a reductio of Anselm's position of arguing from conceptual existence to existential reality. It is possible to conceive of an island than which (which by virtue of its excellencies) none greater can be conceived. But it is greater to exist than not exist, so if this island did not actually exist, we would not be conceiving of an island than which none greater exists. Presumably one could multiply examples ad infinitum at this point. It is clear, though, that Gaunilo's example here misses the mark. First, it seems to play on an equivocation of "greatness" (between absolute and relative). Secondly, Anselm is arguing that the move from existing in intellectu and existing in re only holds for God. This, of course, only pushes us back to Gaunilo's previous point. How is it that in God's case one can argue from mental existence to extra-mental existence? Perhaps God's necessary existence holds the key to this. In any event, this matter would appear to be the heart of Anselm's ontological argument, and its chief difficulty.

The main criticism seems to be that there is an illicit move being made from the obviously true statement:

(1) There is [a thought of something X which must exist.]

To the questionable claim that:

(2) There is [a thought of something X] which must exist.

Regardless of the soundness or Anselm's ontological argument, we may use his definition of God (as "that than which none greater can be conceived") as a guiding and controlling principle for our discourse about God, specifically in the derivation of the divine attributes. This might be regarded as the second major contribution to philosophical theology made by the Proslogion. If God is whatever it is better to be than not to be (quidquid melius est esse quam non esse), then working with our intuitions on "what it is better to be than not to be" we can fill out our conception of God.

1. The first step is to lay out the definition of God as:

[D] God is that than which none greater can be conceived.

and therefore

2. The second step is to consult our intuitions regarding the set of great-making properties and, in conjunction with the definition of God, deduce the divine attributes. Clearly, what we take to be a great-making property will determine what sort of being God is. At one level, we get a skeletal structure that is for the most part uncontroversial.

Differences in the concept of God can arise from the same method when it comes to filling out details.

For each of these properties, Anselm regards the possession of it as intrinsically better than lacking it.

1. God is omnipotent, but there are things which God is not capable of doing. (chapters VI and VII)

2. God is wholly simple (chapters XII, XVIII)

3. God is immaterial and timelessly eternal (chapters XIII, XIX)

1. God is compassionate, but he is not affected by anything. (chapter VIII)

2. God is all-just (chapters IX-XI)

First, 2. and 3. are primarily what is called negative or apophatic theology - discourse about God by way of negating of him what is true of human individuals. Notice also that 3. follows from 2. 1. is what is called positive or cataphatic theology - discourse about God by applying to God (in a manner similar to human persons) things which are true of creatures. These two ways of thinking and talking about God are largely the result of the influence of Neo-Platonism, especially via Pseudo-Dionysius.

Although we can talk rather loosely about God's "attributes," this talk is problematic if we are committed to divine simplicity according to which God lacks all metaphysical composition, and that includes composition of "whatness" (God's substance) and "who-ness" (God's individuality). God is identical with his essence or nature. God is thus identical with all his attributes. 

One of the central questions involved in the use of Perfect Being Theology is the coherence of the concept of God which results from the use of this principle.

First, it might be thought that it is logically incoherent to possess every great-making property, and thus the idea of a maximally perfect being is necessarily incoherent (that is, one which entails self-contradictory propositions). This question depends on what we take to be the set of great-making properties. Some argue that one great-making property is the capacity to grow in knowledge and power. It is obviously not possible to possess that kind of perfection and also to be wholly immutable (or timeless). To avoid logical contradiction we might have to eliminate some candidates for the set of "great-making properties." Some great-making properties are negotiable.

Even here, though, our intuitions seem to involve us in a problem, as some non-negotiable great-making properties seem to lead to incoherence when conjoined. Can a timeless God freely create the world (or do anything)? It might be thought that causes are temporally prior to their effects. But a timeless being's causal powers could never be exercised before their effects. Can a timeless being be omniscient? Some truths it might be thought require location in time to be known (e.g., it is raining now). Can God be omnipotent and wholly good? Will not the power to do anything conflict with doing those things that are morally wrong? Moreover, will not the power of an immaterial being be restricted in a way that a material being's power will not. Apparently, an immaterial being does not have the power to throw a football to Jerry Rice on the field of 3-Com Park.

These problems may be resolved, or at least there is a procedure for resolving them, as follows.

1. A maximally perfect being need not be one that has every great making property, but only one which has the greatest set of compossible great-making properties. So, even if there is a set of non-negotiable great-making properties which are internally inconsistent, what is required is, not that God have each one of those properties, but that God have the greatest set of compossible or compatible great-making properties. So we simply need to find the greatest sub-set of great-making properties which are jointly consistent.

2. It follows from one in some cases certain constraints will have to be placed on how we understand certain divine attributes, otherwise we will have a hard time getting a set of compossible great-making properties. If we think that omniscience and omnipotence are great-making properties and, also that being timelessly eternal is, then we may have to restrict or qualify the quantifier "all" with reference to God's knowledge and power. If God is timelessly eternal, then God's ability to know certain truths might be compromised. It is argued by some that the truth

[A]<it is raining now>

uttered by some person at a particular time, 7:00pm November 20, 1996 tells us something different about the world than the truth

[B]<it is raining on November 20, 1996 at 7:00pm>.

If these two truths are not the same, then a person who knows one does not necessarily know the other. But since [A] requires that a location in time and [B] doesn't, a timeless being could only know [B]. Moreover, since [A] is only true at a particular time and then is no longer true at some later time, an immutable being could not know it either. Knowing its truth would presuppose accidental change, moving from not knowing it to knowing it and then to not knowing it any more.

Similarly, the scope of God's power must be delimited given the selection of his other attributes. It is typically thought that God cannot do what is self-contradictory. This is no real limitation though, since what is self-contradictory is not doable by anyone. But since God's power is also restricted by his nature, depending on what we want to say about God's other attributes we will have to restrict God's power in certain ways. God's goodness, for instance, places a limitation on God's power: God cannot do evil (though other rational agents can). A temporal and mutable being would have the power to do some things which a timeless being does not, namely exert his power at one time and then again at another time. And this opens up the possibility that a temporal and mutable being can exercise his power in response to what other agents do. If you hold that God is timeless, then God will not be able to do certain things which are doable by other rational agents. A timeless being does not have the power to change his mind or respond to other things. An immaterial being does not have the power, as immaterial, to eat a hotdog at a football game.

An essential part of the claim that God is a Maximally Perfect Being must be that God is too perfect to know or do certain things. This itself may be a consequence of a Perfect being being one who has the greatest set of "compossible" great-making properties. Also it must be recognized that the method may be used to derive very different concepts of God depending on the range of non-negotiable great-making properties.

Regarding the latter point, this should not dissuade us from the value of the method for there will also be considerable overlap between the concepts of God derived.

It might be thought that, though the idea of a Maximally Perfect Being is internally consistent, it is not consistent with God as presented in the Bible. It is held by some that the God of the Bible is a temporal being whom makes decisions at certain times and then adjusts his plans in the light of human decisions, and that God is affected by what people do (i.e., he answers prayers, punishes sin, and rewards righteousness). Traditionally, Perfect Being Theology yields a concept of God which is at odds with this picture (because of the intuitions, perhaps of Greek origin, regarding what are great-making properties. Classical theism is easily generated by the Anselmian method. But is the God of Anselmian philosophical theology the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob?

There is first a question as to whether the Anselmian God is logically compatible with the God of Scripture. Secondly, there is the question as to whether the Anselmian concept of God is supported by the data of revelation.

There are many passages that picture God as in some way a temporal being. The language of Scripture in speaking of the acts of God are cast in terms of the exercise of temporally located causal powers. Moreover, God does appear to respond to prayers and to change his mind. The classical theist inevitably argues that such language cannot be taken literally, but expresses to some extent an anthropomorphic conception of God as an accommodation to human understanding. Other passages clearly depict God as a bodily being residing in the sky and who comes down to visit human beings, much like the gods of the Homeric tradition. And yet, theologians who are not compelled to buy into the Anselmian package nonetheless relegate such discourse to the non-literal realm of analogy or metaphor in which anthropomorphism abounds. But why? What criteria do we have to make such interpretive moves. Rather it seems that Perfect Being Theology can function as an interpretive constraint on the reading of Scripture, a guide of road map in our discourse about God whereby we distinguish between those things which are literally true of God and those which must be given some alternative explanation of meaning. Not everything in Scripture can be literally said of God, otherwise we certainly have an incoherent concept of God. But where do we draw the line? Perfect Being Theology helps us at this juncture.

The classical view of God is not clearly incompatible with the God of Scripture, but it might be doubted whether it is supported by Scripture either. Some maintain that timelessness and immutability are both contained in Scripture. This is a hard move. Things may change in many different ways. Scripture says, "I am the Lord I change not." But it does not say what it means to change. Aristotle and others do that job. Immutability as a biblical doctrine seems to refer primarily to God’s faithfulness in keeping his promises to his people. Such a view of character immutability is not the same as the denial of any kind of change whatsoever. Scripture says that God is eternal, but is this eternality complete timelessness or some kind of temporality? Moreover, Scripture says that God is one, but we are not given much in the way of the specifics of this unity, whether for instance it entails the classical doctrine of divine simplicity, that God lacks all metaphysical composition. The more modest position seems to be that with respect to some of the metaphysical attributes of God, they are underdetermined by the data of revelation. The support they have at best is indirect. If we assume such a view of God there are certain explanatory advantages: it might better explain God as creator, as law-giver, as distinct from creation - all of which are explicit biblical themes. Perfect Being Theology in this way could provide a framework for how we understand God as revealed in Scripture.

© Michael Sudduth 1996