"In the Beginning God created the Heavens and the earth" (Genesis 1:1)

 We live on the earth. The earth is one of the several planets that orbit the sun along with thousands of other smaller chunks of matter, stellar dust, and ice particles. Our sun, a medium sized star, is one of many of millions of other stars that constitute our galaxy. Our galaxy belongs to a cluster of nearer galaxies, and there are millions of such galaxies and galaxy clusters strewn across hundreds of millions of light years of space. The distances are great, often unfathomable, and reveal the vastness of the physical system of which we occupy a miniscule part at best, much like a grain of sand on an infinite shore. This is the Universe. It is a complex physical system of material objects of varying sizes and characteristics that are connected in space and time, and which behave and interact according to a relatively small number of physical laws.

The dominant theory in contemporary cosmology regarding the origin of our Universe maintains that the Universe came into existence rather abruptly between 15 to 20 billion years ago in a cosmic explosion from a very simple state in which time and space were infinitely shrunk. The theory, though implied by some of Albert Einstein’s equations, can be traced to the 1920s when astronomers discovered that the observable galaxies were each moving away from each other. It is not as though they are rushing through empty space, but the space between galaxies is actually stretching. The picture implies – when run backwards – that in the distant past the entire Universe was compressed into a single point of infinite density, what mathematicians call a singularity. Space, time, and matter-energy all have their origin in that great cosmic event known as the Big Bang.

The Big Bang suggests that the Universe had a beginning. The ancient Greeks of course denied this. The Universe was eternal for them, as well as for most modern scientists prior to the 1920s. This was partly based on the belief that matter could not be created, could not come into existence from nothing. But the eternal Universe became increasingly challenged in the 19^th century when it became widely recognized that physical processes are irreversible. In this way, the Universe as a whole is a lot like your alarm clock or car. It may be going now, but one day it will stop working, and there is an end to the number of fix-its and tune-ups it can get. Physical systems move toward disorder (a principle codified in the second law of thermodynamics). If the Universe has always existed, then it is likely that every physical process would have already run its course a finite time ago. But in that case we would not observe them now. But we do. The Big Bang took care of many of the paradoxes that existed for astronomers and cosmologists who held to the static or cyclical universe theory.

Of course the Big Bang is, strictly speaking, consistent with a temporally infinite Universe. As some scientists since the 1920s have argued, if we imagine that Big Bang as an explosion outward, we can imagine an implosion in which an expanding Universe reaches its maximum state of outward stretch and then begins to fall back on itself and collapses. The so-called Oscillating Universe theory asserts a series of expansion-contraction phases of different Universes, from Big Bangs to Big Crunches to Big Bangs. So, for instance, the Universe though expanding today, may eventually reach a point in which expansion halts and the entire Universe begins to contract under its own gravity and all the galaxies begin to move inward toward each other. The Universe will have moved from an expansion phase to a contraction phase. Alternatively, the Universe may go on expanding forever, or for a finite time and end in a cool death in which everything eventually burns out. (Certain possibilities seem unlikely given the estimated mass and rate of expansion of the Universe).

More recently the Cambridge physicist Stephen Hawking claims that the Universe, though temporally finite, has no boundaries and so in a sense has no beginning. Hawking accepts the idea of a Big Bang, but without the implication that time has beginning. Einstein held that space, though finite, is closed and so has no boundary. Three-dimensional space is like a two-dimensional sphere. To get an idea of this, take a piece of paper to represent space and then fold it around onto itself. Hawking holds that the same is true about space and time. Among other things, this implies that one could travel through time. If you went far enough in one direction on a sphere you would come back to the same place; if you went far enough into the future, then you would return to the past. But more importantly, for the present consideration, is the consequence that time has no abrupt or clearly defined beginning. The Big Bang theory as explained above suggests that time came into being abruptly, at a definite point. But this isn’t the only possibility

If we run the expanding Universe model backwards, then we eventually get to a point where the entire Universe was shrunk to very, very minute dimensions. Here we would be dealing with phenomena on the atomic scale. But the behavior of atomic and sub-atomic particles is subject to unpredictable fluctuations (what is known as the Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle, after the German physicist Werner Heisenberg). More specifically, measurable quantities like momentum, position, time, and energy are subject to fluctuations in their values. Take something as basic as predicting the future state of an electron. This requires knowing its current position and momentum (position and momentum are properties that form a pair). But according to the uncertainty principle, if one tries accurately to determine the position of an electron, there will be great uncertainty about its momentum (and vice-versa). So no future state of entities at the quantum level can be exactly determined. But it also would seem to follow that quantum fluctuations would have had a significant impact on the structure and evolution of the very, very young Universe, somewhere around the time the Universe was 10^-43 seconds old (so-called Planck time) and about 10^-33 cm across (Planck distance). At this time, quantum fluctuations would have a profound affect on the nature of space and time, and thus on the origin of the Universe.

Einstenian relativity involves three-dimensional space and one-dimensional time unified into a four-dimensional space-time. Here space is physically distinct from time, and we are acquainted with this in our everyday, ordinary experience. My moving driving from Burlington, VT (leaving around 9:00am on May 15th) to Boston, MA and back to Burlington again involves my returning to the same location, but not the same time (9:00am, May 15^th). At the Planck scale, however, the distinction between time and space gets blurred so to speak, so blurred that there is no definite or clearly defined moment at which time begins. For there to be a clearly defined beginning of the Universe, there would have to be a clearly defined moment at which time and space are distinct. But this is precisely what quantum physics seems to deny.

We can represent one Big Bang model of the expanding Universe as a cone (see diagram a. below). Here the apex represents the singularity (the state of infinite compression) and horizontal sections through the cone represent successive moments in the history of the Universe at which times the diameter of the Universe is increased due to expansion. You can imagine a straight line running from the bottom of the cone to the top, representing the direction of time. On this model, there is a single apex that represents a definite moment at which time and space are distinguished. There is a beginning, an abrupt appearance of space and time. However, the alternative representation of the Big Bang according to quantum cosmology would be to smear out the sharpness of the apex, creating a kind of hemisphere (see diagram b.). The radius of the hemisphere would represent Planck time. This model is very much like the first one above the hemisphere, the region that represents the expanding the Universe after the early quantum state. But at the bottom, time curves into space (at the horizontal). Working the other way, time "gradually" separates off from space as the hemisphere turns into the cone. There is no clearly defined beginning of time, but time is bounded in the past.

[Diagrams a. (Big Bang with Sharp Apex) and b. (Big Band with smoothed Apex)]

Two consequences should be noted here. First, the Universe could have popped into existence as the result of fluctuations at the quantum level. As quantum events are undetermined (exactly), so the Universe itself might in effect have no clearly defined cause. Secondly, on Hawking’s view, the singularity vanishes and is replaced by a sphere that represents the gradual emergence of time from space. So, although the Universe is temporally finite, it has no beginning. Both points carry interesting consequences for theism.

Hawking writes:

2. God, Generative Cause or Sustaining Cause?

What is Hawking getting at?

Take the following argument. Call it the G-cosmological argument.

1. Anything that comes into existence must have a cause (preceding it) that brought it into existence.
2. The Universe came into existence.
3. Therefore, the Universe has a cause (preceding it) that brought it into existence.

Why must this cause be God? Why not the Big Bang itself? With regards to the second question, the kind of cause we’re looking for here must lie outside the Universe, the Big Bang presupposes an infinitely compressed state of matter-energy. Since this is more properly the first state, we’re looking for a cause of that reality. Now it would have to be a cause, and one that lies outside the Universe, outside the realm of matter, space, and time. But it would have to be a causal power of some sort. This is certainly included in what most people understand by the term God. Whether this is a personal being, as God is also understood to be and a perfect personal being, depends on further considerations, which I hold off for the moment. Suffice it to say, if one is attempting an inference to the best explanation, all that is needed is that one’s concept of the First Cause be such as to render explicable the emergence of the Universe. An immaterial intelligent, purposeful agent with knowledge and power, transcendent to space and time seems to be appropriate for this slot. Clearly, the argument needs an additional premise like

(iv) The best candidate for First Cause is God.

Hawking seems saying that we can reason to the existence of God only if an argument of the form of the G-cosmological argument is sound, has all true premises and proceeds logically (validly) to its conclusion. The argument is valid, but Hawking thinks that it is unsound since he thinks (ii) is false. For Hawking, though, if (ii) were true that would (along with (i)) provide a place for God to come into the picture. The key assumption is that God’s only role would be that of generating the cosmos from nothing. We can represent the argument by the following diagram.

GOD =>. . . S1 => S2 => S3 => S4

Here S4 represents the current state of the Universe. S4 represents a prior state of the Universe. The diagram shows that S4 is explained by S3 along with the appropriate laws of physics operational at S3, which together logically entail S4. If we trace this back to the earliest state of the Universe, we find that, although S1 give rise to S2 along with the appropriate physical laws, if S1 came into existence, there will need be a prior cause of S1 and the initial laws that will govern the evolution of the Universe. Here God is responsible for starting the whole process off. So if the universe began in an incredibly small but infinitely dense and compacted state (in which time and space where infinitely shrunken) and the history of the cosmos is the history of the expansion of this original fire ball (giving rise to the great many physical objects which make up the universe today), God may be introduced to explain the existence of that singularity and what got it to "explode" and so begin expanding. Hawking’s point of course is that if there is no definite S1 there is no need to put God in the place of an ultimate first cause.

But Hawking’s argument seems to miss the obvious. It is true that if the Universe has a beginning, we can ask who or what was responsible for getting it going or started? And true enough, if the Universe had no beginning, then we could not ask who or what was responsible for getting it started? In the case of a temporally finite Universe, one that has a beginning, we are naturally led to ask "what caused that beginning?" We want to know about a generative cause of the Universe’s existence, or more specifically the Universe’s first state, the singularity. But if the Universe has existed for infinite time or finite time but without a beginning, we can ask a different kind of question. Why does it exist? It is at this point that God can come into the picture. If the Universe has a beginning, we can ask what caused it to begin to exist. If the Universe has no beginning, we can ask what is responsible for its existence (as long as it exists)?

Now there is a sense in which the Universe’s existence today is explained by its existence at some earlier state, plus the appropriate laws of nature entailing its existence today. The existence of the physical universe today is explained by its prior states plus certain laws of nature which deterministically predict that it will exist today. More generally, the existence of the universe U at any time tn is explained by the following two facts:

1. U exists at t1.

2. There are physical laws L which give an equation like U at t1 + L = U at t2 (where t2 is a later state of the universe).

If the universe is infinitely old, then there is an infinite succession of states of U, each of which deterministically follows from a prior state plus some physical laws L. If the universe is finite in age, then the universe has a chain of explanation which terminates with the universe’s first state and the physical laws operational at that point. (Recall, though, that for Hawking, there is no real first state of the Universe).

But this explanation of any given state of the Universe does not address the larger cosmic question: why is there a succession of states of the Universe? Leibniz, for instance, claimed that we cannot find in the parts of a thing a sufficient explanation of the whole. It is one thing to explain why a particular member of a series exists, it is another to explain the existence of the whole series itself. Suppose a book of Geometry has always existed, and one copy of the book is copied from another and handed down, and so on ad infinitum. We now ask, where did the geometry book come from? If appeal is made either to a previous member or the whole series of copied books, we have not answered the question of where the geometry book as such has come from, for we still do not known ultimately why the geometry book as such exists. We only know that this particular book has come from that one, and so on. Each state of the universe might have an explanation in an earlier state, plus laws of nature, but that does not tell us why there are any states at all (whether for infinite or finite time).

(1) The universe exists.

(2) Things that exist require a cause for their existence.

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(3) The Universe requires a cause for its existence. (from, 1,2)

(4) The best candidate for this ultimate cause is God.

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(5) Therefore, it is likely that God exists. (from 3,4)

. > . . .S1 => S2 => S3 => S4

S1-S4 represent states of the universe at distinct times. Laws of nature bring about the development of one state of the universe into another. God is responsible for L (for as long as the universe exists, whether for infinite or finite time), and thus God is conceived of the ultimate cause or sustaining cause of the universe. Hawking is therefore incorrect when he suggests that the only role for a God would be to start off the Universe. Even if the Universe has no beginning (and so no role for God to play in getting it going) God could enter the picture as an explanation for why the Universe exists at all, for however long it has existed.

We are faced with a very basic question in philosophy. Is there an ultimate explanation for the existence of the Universe? And if so, is there any reason to believe that that explanation involves the existence of God?

 A cosmological argument revolves around the idea that things which exist (or which come into existence) require a cause or explanation. The cosmological argument is an argument to the existence of God either from (I) the fact that the universe exists or (ii) some corollary of this, such as cause and effect or change. Cosmological arguments can be either deductive or abductive. There have been several versions of the cosmological argument.

Thomas's arguments for the existence of God all begin with some observation from everyday experience which he wants to claim raises questions which can only be answered by eventually postulating an extra-mundane reality, which he calls God.

The Argument from Motion

(1) Objections are in motion

(2) If something is in motion, then is must be caused to be in motion by something outside itself.

(3) There can be no infinite chain of movers/movees.

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(4) So, there is a first, unmoved mover

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(5) Therefore, God exists.

1. The argument rests on a fall premise, premise (2). Premise (2) assumes that motion requires an outside force. But according to Newton an object will remain at rest or in uniform motion unless it is acted upon by a force. Therefore, the motion of an object at any time need not require an external cause. So Aquinas's argument is unsound. (p. 41)

2. The final conclusion of the argument is that (5) "God exists", but this does not follow from (4). A physicist might believe that a cosmological big bang is responsible for all motion, but refuse to identify this initial cosmic event with God. Since God is a person who is all-knowing, all powerful, and all-good, the mere fact that there is one unmoved mover doesn't logically commit you to believing this "thing" or "event" is God. So the argument appears invalid. (p. 42)

3. Sober says that if we assume that every causal chain must terminate with an unmoved mover (or uncaused cause), it doesn't follow that there must be only one and the same unmoved mover for ever causal chain. He calls this the birthday fallacy. From the fact that <every person has a day on which he is born> it does not follow that <there is some particular day that is everyone's birthday>. So likewise, <everything that is moved is moved by something else> does not logically entail that <there is some one thing which moves everything>. Once again the argument appears invalid. (p. 42)

1a. Premise (2) may be modified to avoid Sober's first criticism altogether. We may understand by motion, not something as specific as locomotion, buy more generally the idea of real or genuine change in a subject. In fact this is what Thomas Aquinas meant by "motion". He means to distinguish between the state of being "actually" something and the state of merely being "potentially" something. Motion is a crudely moving from being potentially something "F" to actually being that thing F. So, "change" understood in these terms should replace "motion" throughout the argument. More importantly, it follows that Thomas would agree with Newton that in object in uniform motion does not require an external force as changer, for the simple fact such an object is not actually undergoing a process of change IF it is moving at constant speed in a rectilinear motion. Acceleration and change in direction WOULD constitute a change for Aquinas, and that is what requires a changer. An object in constant rectilinear motion is actually in that state and potentially accelerated or changed in direction. If such a change happens. Something external to the thing must have caused it. But Newton would agree with this.

1b. Thomas is not thinking of temporally ordered or linear causal series in any of his arguments. He is not thinking about some past state of affairs which gives rise to something we now observe. (E.g., your parents caused your existence by something they did years ago, but your existence here-and-now does not require that your parents be alive at this moment. Once you hit a ball, it will - as Newton points out - keep going even if you cease to exist at some point when it is in flight). But we may also ask what is here-and-now responsible for causal processes that are going on here-and-now. So, the argument from change to God is Thomas's way of arguing that the process of change as we see it in the world right now requires a kind of vertical chain or path which ends with some single reality responsible for the whole series but external to the series. If one thing A is changed by another B, and B is changed by C, and so on ad infinitum, then Aquinas thinks the whole (infinite) series is changing. But if nothing changes itself (see above), then the whole changing series requires a changer that is not a member of the series itself. So there cannot in fact be an infinite regress of changers.

2. (a) Indeed God is more than a cause, but God is at least a cause and the argument actually terminates not with "a" cause among other causes, but with the highest of causes. Moreover, this thing which is a First Cause cannot, according to Aquinas, be part of the universe (for then it would also need explaining), so the First Cause cannot be thought of as even equivalent to a cosmic Big Bang. The First Cause of Aquinas's arguments transcends time, space, and matter. Such a First Cause or Unmoved Mover must be eternal, unchanging, and immaterial. This is very similar to how God is conceived of in traditional monotheism. [Perhaps some abduction works here. If anything is God, then it would be these things; but if something were not God we would be quite surprised to find it that it was God.] In theism, though God is more than these things, he is at least these things, so any argument which concludes that such a begin exists, concludes with a description of a being very much like the God of traditional monotheism theism. (b) Sober's argument overlooks the fact that things may differ in sense, but not in reference. The same thing may be referred to under different description. The reference of the term "God" in the conclusion is the same as the God of traditional monotheism even if the sense is not identical (just as an argument which proved the existence of the morning star would prove the existence of the same thing which is described as the evening star - same reference, different sense). (c) Aquinas simply assumes that everyone understands the first mover to be God because that was an axiom of the tradition going back to Presocratic philosophy - the source of the world is God. (d) These arguments are, for Aquinas, only a starting point for the rational discussion of God. They are not intended to be complete descriptions of God.

3. Aquinas does have as a premise "everything undergoing change is changed by something else" and he does believe in fact that "there is One thing which changes everything." But as the argument makes clear, even as stated by Sober, Aquinas does not infer the latter merely from the former. There are additional premises, such as the impossibility of an infinite regress, which facilitate that inference.

4. Sober begins by saying that the argument from motion is supposed to be an abductive argument, but then his criticisms attack their deductive validity or soundness. Most of his criticisms are logically compatible with the argument being a strong abductive argument.

Since the 17th century, philosophers have presented alternative accounts of the cosmological argument. These are a kind of logical extension of Aquinas' first two arguments, for might think of the argument from change and cause/effect as arguing for a single extra-mundane cause (or changer) as an explanation of a whole series of intra-mundane causes (or movers), where the latter is taken simply as one big object in need of explanation.

No, as explained above in relation to Hawking, a cosmological argument does not require that the universe had a beginning, for even if the universe has always existed we can ask the question why does the universe exist at all? A cosmological argument which postulates God as a cause for the universe's beginning (in time) is called a "kalam" cosmological argument.

Non-Kalam Version of the Cosmological Argument:

. > . . .S5 => S4 => S3 => S2 => S1

S5-S1 represent states of the universe at distinct times. Laws of nature bring about the development of one state of the universe into another. God is responsible for L (for as long as the universe exists, whether for infinite or finite time).

Kalam Version:

GOD => . . S5 => S4 => S3 => S2 => S1

Here God is responsible for starting the whole process off. So if the universe began in an incredibly small but infinitely dense and compacted state (in which time and space where infinitely shrunken) and the history of the cosmos is the history of the expansion of this original fire ball (giving rise to the great many physical objects which make up the universe today), God may be introduced to explain the existence of that singularity and what got it to "explode" and so begin expanding.

It appears that there may be no deductively valid argument for the existence of God. If there were, it would be (or entail) a contradiction to assert the truth of the premises and the falsity of the conclusion. But it does not appear to involve a contradiction to assert that God does not exist and yet a complex physical system exists. We may have to rest content with abductive arguments which make the existence of God which strongly support or make probable the hypothesis that God exists.

Abductive Argument Form:

The general form of an abductive cosmological argument will be something like:

(1) There is a physical universe.

(2) If God exists, then we would expect there to be a physical universe.

(3) If God does not exist, then we would not expect there to be a physical universe.

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(4) Therefore, God exists.

So there will be a good abductive argument for the existence of God from the fact that there is a physical universe only if premises (2) and (3) are true. But are they both true?

Is it the case that the existence of God would lead us to expect that there be a physical universe? To answer this you need to think about what is meant when the existence of God is affirmed. By God we will understand a perfectly free immaterial being who is all-knowing, all-powerful, and all-good. Does the mere existence of such a being make it probable that there would be a physical universe?

The problem with arguing for premise (2) is that God’s freedom makes it very difficult to see how premise (2) could be true. If God was free to create or not to create, then one possibility open to God was not to create at all. If God was free to create a different kind of universe, then he might have created a purely immaterial universe (e.g., a universe of only angels), a purely physical universe, or two universes (one material one immaterial), etc. The possibilities could be extended. But it does appear that if God had no overriding reason to create any one of these many options open to Him, then it will be hard to argue that God’s existence would lead us to expect that he would create a physical universe. (Note: even if you argued that God’s goodness would lead us to expect that he would want to share himself with others, it is still hard to argue that he could have been expected to create a physical universe, since he could have equally shared himself in a creator-creation relationship with solely immaterial beings in a purely immaterial reality.

So premise (2) is, or at least rate appears, to be false, unless we drop God’s freedom from the picture. It follows that however things turn out with evaluating the third premise, we will not have a strong abductive argument for the existence of God based solely on the existence of the physical universe.

C. Evaluating Premise (3)

But is it the case that if God did not exist, we would not expect the physical universe to exist. This is NOT the same question as implied by premise (2). Premise (2) asked how probable is it that the universe would exist if God existed, premises (3) asks how improbable is the universe’s existence if God does not exist.

Two questions are essential to answering this question:

(1) Is it meaningful or coherent to even raise the question about a cause of the universe?

(2) If it is meaningful, is there an alternative hypothesis to theism that explains there being a universe.

Premise (3) asks how unlikely the universe is if an alternative hypothesis is true. One way of going about this is to ask how likely the existence of a physical universe would be if some other hypothesis (logically compatible with the negation of theism) is true. So we’ll have to distinguish between H1 (there is a God) and H2 (a set of alternatives, including the negation of H1 and those hypotheses compatible with the negation of H1).

Here are some possible arguments relevant to answering (1) and (2) above.

1. To think that the universe has a cause because all contingent things do is a logical fallacy of composition (what is true of the part is true of the whole). RESPONSE: The whole does not always have the same characteristics as the parts, as the inference from <all the bricks in the wall are small>, therefore <the wall is small> is a fallacy. But sometimes the whole does have characteristics of the part, e.g., the brick wall is made of bricks after all. In this latter case, if the bricks ceased to exist, the wall would too. But the contingency of the universe is like this, if the parts of the universe ceased to exist, so would the universe itself. So the universe is contingent. It could cease to exist; it might not have existed at all. Why it exists is therefore a proper question.

2. We can never reach an answer to the question about the origin of the cosmos as a whole because the universe is a unique object and we can only reach rational conclusions about things that belong to kinds. RESPONSE: If this were true, then we could never reach any kind of conclusion about the universe (its size, mass, rate of expansion, etc), nor could we even come to conclusions about the nature of the human race. But every object is unique under some description. Although we can describe the universe as a unique object (as I can describe the object in front of me as the computer belonging to Michael Sudduth located a certain distance from the ground and front door of Sudduth's apartment), we can also describe it in terms which makes questions about the whole both intelligible and in principle soluble. The universe consists of certain objects which have the same properties (mass, density, etc). The universe itself has these properties, since the universe just is the complex system of physical objects and the laws of their behavior.

1. The universe has always existed. Therefore, it does not need a cause. RESPONSE: (a) There are scientific reasons for rejecting the idea that the universe has always existed. The second of thermodynamics states that systems move toward disorder or breakdown. Since the universe is a system (a physical system), it too is moving toward disorder (though very slowly). E.g., the galaxies are all moving away from each other as the space between them stretches. So the universe will eventually die. But if the universe has always existed (existed for infinite time), then it would have already reached its point of maximum disorder and would have died. But the universe has not died yet. (b) The cosmological argument does not require that the universe have a beginning and so a generative cause. Recall that Thomas Aquinas’s argument against an infinite regress was not intended to be an argument against a merely temporal infinite regress. The cosmological argument may simply be arguing that the universe, whether of finite or infinite in age, must have a (sustaining) cause for its existence. Why does anything exist at all?

2. The universe is the product of quantum fluctuations and as such has no cause. The study of the characteristics and behavior of subatomic particles reveals their measurable qualities (e.g., position, momentum, etc.) are subject to unpredictable fluctuations. This is known as "Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle." The upshot of it is that some quantum events have no (clearly defined) cause, and so the cause and effect link is very weak at the ultramicroscopic level. Some cosmologists claim that the universe may be the result of quantum fluctuations, an event with no cause. RESPONSE: It is doubtful whether what is true at the subatomic level is true at the macrolevel (i.e., the level of ordinary sized and large objects). This seems to stretch the applicability of quantum theory beyond its intended scope.

1. The universe as a whole is explained by an explanation of its parts, and since we can scientifically explain the parts of the universe in terms of other parts of it we have no need to appeal to God. The existence of the physical universe today is explained by its prior states plus certain laws of nature which deterministically predict that it will exist today. More generally, the existence of the universe U at any time tn is explained by the following two facts:

1. U exists at t1.

2. There are physical laws L which give an equation like U at t1 + L = U at t2 (where t2 is a later state of the universe).

If the universe is infinitely old, then there is an infinite succession of states of U, each of which deterministically follows from a prior state plus some physical laws L. If the universe is finite in age, then the universe has a chain of explanation which terminates with the universe’s first state and the physical laws operational at that point.

RESPONSE: Leibniz and others reject this objection, because they doubt that we can find in the parts of a thing a sufficient explanation of the whole. It is one thing to explain why a particular member of a series exists, it is another to explain the existence of the whole series itself. Suppose a book of Geometry has always existed, and one copy of the book is copied from another and handed down, and so on ad infinitum. We now ask, where did the geometry book come from? If appeal is made either to a previous member or the whole series of copied books, we have not answered the question of where the geometry book as such has come from, for we still do not known why the geometry book as such exists. We only know that this particular book has come from that one, and so on. Each state of the universe might have an explanation in an earlier state, plus laws of nature, but that does not tell us why there are any states at all (whether for infinite or finite time).

2. Our universe U1 is the result of a radical quantum fluctuation in another, larger (mother) universe U2, which led to the separation of U1 from U2. According to this view, one universe gave birth to another one. Imagine one universe represented by a dimensional sheet. Curvature arises in the sheet from the effects of gravity. Since the more intense the gravity, the more radical the curvature, it follows that if gravity is intense enough a protuberance can form a mini-universe (U1) connected to the original universe (U2) by a kind of fluctuating throat or unstable gravitational tunnel. (So-called "worm holes" in physics). The instability could lead to a complete break between the two, in which can one universe gives birth to another. Perhaps our universe originated in the same way. Response: whatever the scientific evidence for this, it will only explain our universe in terms of another universe. There is still the question of where that one came from (why it exists at all). Postulate even an infinite number of universes giving birth, or a chain of such universe creation, and you still haven’t provided a sufficient reason for why anything exists at all.

3. The universe is self-contained, and so has no need of a God hypothesis. If the universe is understood as the four dimensional space-time continuum, and if it has in fact originated from an initial singularity (in which time and space was infinitely shrunken), then the first state of the universe and all succeeding states would be determined by the very basic laws in existence at the singularity. The universe kind of "creates itself." In another words, the universe exists today because it came from the singularity. Where did the singularity come from. Here physicists draw on the idea from quantum physics that some things exist without a case. To put it boldly, the singularity just happened (or existed) and that’s the end of it. Response: At one level this explains the first state of the universe (defined one way) by appealing to some more simple reality out of which the universe came into existence with the cosmic big bang. But where did that "simple reality" come from? Once again, why this "simple" something rather than nothing? To say "it’s just there," is not much of an explanation. Moreover, we may doubt the applicability of quantum physics here as well.

The cosmological argument only shows that the Universe has a cause, not that the cause is God. Hume, for instance, pointed out that the cosmological argument could not terminate with an infinite being or cause, just because a finite universe would only need a finite cause.

RESPONSE: (1) Well, if are trying to explain the existence (not necessarily beginning) of the Universe, then we need an entity that is the proper stopping point of explanation. Since a proper stopping point of explanation should not raise the very question it is designed to answer, a contingent cause of the Universe will not end the regress of explanation. So the argument properly claims to conclude with a necessary being, and one with causal power. This seems is at least a minimal outcome of the argument. Furthermore, the exegencies of explanatory adequacy led Aristotle and Thomas to argue that the First Cause must also be wholly simple, and immaterial, immutable, and timeless. (Some of these may follow from being necessary, depending on how "necessity" is construed). This being sounds a lot like God as understood in the Western tradition.

(2) More generally, and as the preceding indicates, the plausibility of the objection depends in part on how one constructs the cosmological argument. The objection is quite irrelevant to all probabilistic versions of the cosmological argument, which aim to show, at least, that theism better explains the cosmological data than alternative hypotheses. Strictly speaking, one can admit that the evidence does not logically entail God, but most scientific theories are not entailed by their respective evidence either. But they are still regarded as the rational way to look at matters. What is crucial here is the nature of inference to best explanation. The theistic hypothesis may be a very simple hypothesis that leads us to expect what we in fact observe, more so than alternative hypotheses, perhaps even more so than the negation of the theistic hypothesis.

(3) Moreover, if one is employing the evidence used in the cosmological argument as part of cumulative case argument, the issue will be what sort of being best explains all the data. Here there will be an immense range of data that includes the spatial and temporal regularities exhibited by the Universe, its fine-tuning, miracles, religious experience, etc. What explains the Universe will also explain a whole range of other phenomena. The plausibility of the First Cause being God is increased by such additional considerations. Also, if there is reason to prefer simple explanations over more complex ones, then preference should be given to an explanation that involves a being with infinite power and knowledge, for this would be a more simple being (at least in this sense, that if a being is limited, one can ask the question, what limits it that way, and further explanation is needed). Hume was mistaken, perhaps by thinking of the argument in its deductive forms. The issue isn't whether a finite Universe *could* be created by a finite being, but whether an infinite cause is the more likely explanation, and this depends in part on which is the more simple hypothesis that also has the requisite predictive power (i.e, correctly predicting what we in fact observe).

So, O.K., God created the Universe, but who created God?

RESPONSE: (1) The cosmological argument aims to explain the existence of contingent beings, or a contingent Universe, in terms of a transcendent being, one who is necessary. If someone created God, God would be a contingent being, and hence would not be God. If someone created a necessary being, then the necessary being would not be necessary. But if the cosmological argument is sound, or there is a good probabalistic version of it, to ask where God or the First Cause came from is to reveal a fundamental misunderstanding regarding the nature of the argument in the first place. Moreover, it may be asking a question that is not even coherent, and so not a genuine question at all. (2) In "inference to best explanation" a particular hypothesis can explain phenomena even in the absence of an explanation for the hypothesis (assuming it has one). Mendel used "genes" to explain "common characteristics between parents and offspring," but the success of such an explanation did not depend on Mendel also being able to explain the existence of genes. 

It does not appear that science can explain the origin of the universe only in a limited way, a way that begs the question against the more ultimate question the cosmological argument is interested in pursuing. That question is about radical contingency: why anything exists at all! This question is simply too global for science to explain (See Sober, p. 77). So we must choose between stopping explanation with the kinds of alternative explanations suggested above, or postulating a God. Postulating God makes intelligible what is otherwise very inexplicable.

 The truth of premise (3) alone does not suggest that God's existence is more probable than not given the existence of a physical universe, nor that there is strong support for God’e existence. At best we have an argument which adds to the probability of God's existence somewhat. Without the truth of premises (2), we are left with a weak abductive argument for the existence of God based on the existence of the universe. The argument, as we have constructed it, is "significant" but nonetheless appears to lack the punch necessary for a strong abductive argument.

On the abductive or proabilistic arguments for God's existence, including the cosmological, see Richard Swinburne, The Existence of God (Oxford, 1979).

© Michael Sudduth 1998