According to Calvin, "There is within the human mind, and indeed by natural instinct, an awareness of divinity. . . .God himself has implanted in all men a certain understanding of his divine majesty" (Institutes, 1. 3. 1.).¹ Closely related to this sensus divinitatis is an external witness or revelation of God in creation. "Not only," writes Calvin has God, "sowed in men's minds that seed of religion of which we have spoken but revealed himself and daily discloses himself in the whole workmanship of the universe. As a consequence, men cannot open their eyes without being compelled to see him" (1. 5. 1.).

In the 1930s Karl Barth and Emil Brunner debated whether and to what extent human persons have a natural knowledge of God, especially as this question arises in the context of John Calvin’s discussion of the knowledge of God in his Institutes of the Christian Religion. Barth is well known for his rejection of natural theology on the grounds that there is no knowledge of God, even as creator, apart from a knowledge of God as redeemer. Barth’s slogan, finitum non est capax infiniti est, expressed his fundamental conviction that God can only be known when He reveals Himself and the noetic effects of sin entail that grace is a necessary precondition for all knowledge of God. Barth believed that Calvin shared this conviction.

Barth wrote:

More recently, in "Reforming the ‘Reformed’ Objection to Natural Theology,"³ John Beversluis has argued the Barthian line in a critique of Alvin Plantinga's interpretation and use of Calvin's doctrine of the sensus divinitatis. In chapter five I explained that Plantinga sees in Calvin's sensus divinitatis a particular way of thinking about how it is that human persons have an immediate knowledge of God. In short, we have been designed with a natural disposition to form theistic belief in a wide range of experiential circumstances, circumstances involving the external witness of God in creation. When our cognitive faculties are functioning properly we hold firm theistic beliefs when in those circumstances. Plantinga takes this belief forming process as something actual for many human persons, not merely hypothetical.

Beversluis contends that Plantinga has misconstrued Calvin’s doctrine of the sensus divinitatis and as a result has substantially weakened Calvin’s account of the noetic effects of sin. Like Barth, Beversluis claims that Calvin explicitly denies any natural knowledge of God for fallen human persons. Plantinga, he thinks, fails to see this because he takes Calvin's discussion of the sensus divinitatis out of context. Whereas Plantinga understands Calvin’s references to a functioning sensus divinitatis (in the Institutes 1:1-5) to refer to humans in their fallen state, Beversluis maintains that Calvin's discussion of the natural knowledge of God in these chapters is confined to a consideration of man's pre-fallen (or pre-lapsarian) state. Hence, the latent epistemology of belief if God found in Calvin's sensus divinitatis is inapplicable to the epistemic capacities of fallen (or post-lapsarian) humans. It is irrelevant to an account of the human epistemic situation with reference to belief in God. According to Beversluis, the fundamental thesis of the opening chapters of Book I of the Institutes is that "fallen human beings lack both the direct and immediate knowledge of God with which they were created and the capacity to achieve it" (RRO, p. 193). The sensus divinitatis is not merely "suppressed" by sin, but it is extinguished by sin (RRO, pp. 193-94). As a result, the sensus divinitatis "with which human beings were originally created is no longer operative in fallen humanity" (RRO, p. 193). Although there remains an objectively clear revelation of God (as Creator) in nature, it is subjectively obscured by sin. In fact, the revelation of God as Creator is not seen at all. Beversluis contrasts Plantinga's interpretation of Calvin with his own: Calvin "unambiguously asserts that, in their present fallen condition, human beings have no eyes to discern the revelation of God in Nature" (RRO, p. 194).

After quoting Calvin (Institutes 1.5.15) to the effect that post-lapsarian humans are by nature unable to attain "the pure and clear knowledge of God" he continues. . . .

Beversluis then gives what he takes to be Calvin’s account of how fallen human beings can and do attain knowledge of God. What is required is the revelation of God in the Scriptures, as well as an internal work of grace in the heart. The natural revelation of God in creation cannot be perceived without faith. Without the internal illumination of the Holy Spirit fallen humans "are not capable - much less, innately disposed - to form the belief that God exists upon contemplating the beauty or the grandeur of Nature" (RRO, p. 196). In their fallen state humans "can believe in God only so far as the regenerating work of the Holy Spirit enables them to do so." (RRO, p. 197). The point is reiterated in his striking conclusion: "He [Calvin] is a fideist through and through - a theologian who believes that, so far as fallen human beings are concerned, knowledge of God is the result of the internal illumination of the Holy Spirit and hence a gift to God's elect" (RRO, p. 200).

Is Beversluis, or more generally the Barthian position, correct? I think not.

When discussing Calvin's position on the natural knowledge of God, it is important to keep in mind the distinct senses in which Calvin uses the expression "knowledge of God." The negative interpretation of Calvin's view of natural knowledge of God in thinkers like Barth and Beversluis typically depends on confusion at this juncture. Calvin prefaces his entire discussion on man's knowledge of God in the Institutes with this statement:

Calvin immediately distinguishes this kind of knowledge from another sort:

So already Calvin has introduced two important concepts in these opening words of chapter two of book one of the Institutes.

(1) The distinction between knowledge of God as creator and knowledge of God as redeemer - the so-called duplex cognitio Dei (two-fold knowledge of God).

(2) The primal and simple knowledge of God as creator, which includes (a) conceiving that there is a God, (b) grasping what benefits us and is proper to his glory, and (c) piety, which Calvin defines as "that reverence joined with love of God which the knowledge of his benefits induces." (Institutes 1.2.1).

Calvin seems to identify several other expressions with (2): "the contemplation of the one and only true God" (Institutes 1.2.2), "true knowledge of him [God] (Institutes 1.4.1), and "pure and clear knowledge of God" (Institutes 1.5.15). Moreover, Calvin claims that not only does (1) require the Scriptural revelation but since the fall even (2) requires the Scriptural revelation: "Gathering up our otherwise confused knowledge of God in our minds, having dispersed out dullness, clearly shows us the true God." (Institutes 1.6.1). Although Calvin indicates that only Scripture reveals God as Redeemer, in Book 1 of the Institutes he focuses on knowledge of God as Creator, and beginning with chapter 6 he argues that Scripture is a necessary condition for (2). The unregenerate man lacks (2), as well as knowledge of God as Redeemer. Unregenerate persons do not have a knowledge of the true God, a true knowledge of God, nor a pure and clear knowledge of God - as Calvin understands these phrases, as they all entail (2). The question is whether Calvin also concedes some third sense of "knowledge of God" according to which it is correct to say that the unregenerate do, presently and individually, have a knowledge of God. For instance, (2) has at least three components. To say that biblical revelation and divine grace is needed for a knowledge of God in the sense of (2) does not logically entail that it is necessary for any one of the components of (2). But it might be reasonable to refer to some of those components by themselves as knowledge of God.

Calvin writes:

Calvin also uses the following phrases: "a sense of deity inscribed on the hearts of all" (Institutes 1.3.1), "some conception of God is ever alive in all men's minds" (Institutes 1.3.2), men's minds as "imbued with a firm conviction about God" (Institutes 1.3.2), "this conviction. . .that there is some God" (Institutes 1.3.3). Calvin is attributing these beliefs to presently fallen, unregenerate persons. What he says here is not equivalent to (2), even though it is entailed by (2). The sensus divinitatis is one element involved in the primal and simple knowledge of God, but it is hardly the same thing. Inasmuch as its existence for post-lapsarian man is consistent with failing to love and reverence God, an awareness of divinity does not entail obeying God, does not entail piety. What we seem to have in view here is propositional knowledge of God, which is also one element within the more narrow use of "knowledge of God" in sense (2) above.

So then a third sense of knowledge of God that may be construed as propositional, a knowing that some proposition is true.

(3) There is a knowledge of God, associated with the sensus divinitatis, that consists in holding true beliefs about God.⁴

Of course, given the distinction between true belief and knowledge (discussed in chapter 5) there is an epistemological question here as to whether these (true) beliefs produced by the sensus divinitatis (i.e., that there is a God, one God, and that he is our maker,etc.) constitute knowledge. (3) should be regarded then as a first approximation to a more complete statement. I shall return to that below (in section 3).

It seems that Beversluis in typical Barthian fashion does not pay sufficient attention to the distinctions articulated above.

In the first part of Beversluis’ paper, in which he presents his first critique of Plantinga, he assumes - like Plantinga - a true belief plus "something else" account of knowledge. Here it is propositional knowledge about God that is at issue, and Beversluis’ main claim is that the sensus divinitatis is epistemically inefficacious since it does not produce theistic beliefs of the sort that Plantinga claims. Plantinga's error is a defective view of the noetic effects of sin, thinking that humans could naturally form theistic beliefs (and theistic knowledge) that they cannot apart from grace. Unless a person is given the gift of faith by grace, there is no knowledge of God (i.e., true belief plus something else) based on the revelation of God in nature.

However, in the second part of his paper, Beversluis introduces a different sense to the locution "knowledge of God." He says that the kind of "knowledge" which Calvin thinks is essential to the Christian life is not merely theoretical in nature (a knowledge that or about, so-called propositional knowledge) but a knowledge which is experiential or affective and impacts human life and action.⁵

After quoting from Calvin's Institutes (1.2.1 and 1.5.9), Beversluis writes:

According to Beversluis grace is a necessary precondition for this particular kind of "knowledge of God", call it the "experiential" knowledge of God, which includes a love of and obedience to God. This corresponds to knowledge of God in sense (2) above. This kind of knowledge is not the same as the theoretical or propositional knowledge Beversluis discusses in the first part of his paper, and which is captured by (3), so the sense in which fallen humans cannot have a natural knowledge of God changes in the course of the paper. Although there is no logical inconsistency in denying a post-lapsarian natural knowledge of God in Beversluis’ two senses, I do not think that Beversluis has properly handled the distinction he draws. Moreover, I think that the failure to handle this distinction properly leads Beversluis into a rather significant contradiction in his own argument.

After explaining the distinction between a mere theoretical knowledge of God and the affecting knowledge of God, Beversluis admits that fallen humans "already believe in God" (RRO, p. 199). He adds: "there are no atheists." Here Beversluis reconstructs what he takes to be Calvin’s "Reformed" objection to natural theology: since everyone already believes in God, there is no point to constructing theistic arguments. And natural theology is concerned with theoretical not experiential knowledge of God. Beversluis takes these two points to be the essence of the original Reformed objection to natural theology, not a commitment to properly basic theistic beliefs as Plantinga holds.

I find Beversluis’ statements in the second part of his paper most perplexing given all he argued in the first part of his article. The great dichotomy in his first argument was between a theoretical knowledge about God construed as a deliverance of reason (Plantinga's Calvin) and the view that all such theoretical knowledge is achievable only by divine grace (Beversluis' Calvin).⁶ Much was made of the point that without grace fallen persons do not even have the capacity "to form the belief that God exists" when they look at beauty and grandeur of nature. What could Beversluis possibly mean, then, when he asserts both (i) everyone already believes in God and (ii) no one can believe in God apart from a work of grace? If we assume (as Beversluis appears to) that grace is not given to everyone, then (ii) entails that some people do not believe in God. But this contradicts his later statements according to which people do hold certain propositions about the existence of God. Perhaps part of the problem here is that Beversluis does not unpack his crucial concession that people do believe in God. He does not explain the content of such beliefs. Are all such beliefs of fallen humans false beliefs, so that they do not constitute (theoretical) knowledge? This seems implausible. Or are they true but lacking some other property necessary for knowledge? He develops no epistemological apparatus to clarify his claims. He is simply vague about how this "belief in God" present in every fallen person differs from the "belief in God" Plantinga is concerned with elucidating and which Beversluis asserts cannot be arrived at without grace.

 2. Calvin and Propositional Knowledge of God as Creator

In contrast to Beversluis I think it is quite clear that Calvin teaches that fallen, and yes unregenerate, people do hold (some) true beliefs about God, where such beliefs are among the deliverances of reason. In this sense, then, fallen humans can and do have a natural knowledge of God apart from an internal work of the Spirit. Moreover, there are a number of epistemological theories that would allow construing such beliefs as possessing positive epistemic status. We should grant that this sort of knowledge is not Calvin's focus or main interest, but it is nonetheless an unpacked presupposition in his texts. Now I suggested above Calvin says very little about what would turn these true beliefs about God into knowledge (perhaps he thought true belief was propositional knowledge). But he does use the word "knowledge" to refer to these true beliefs.

(i) The title of the chapter is "the knowledge of God has been naturally implanted in the minds of all men" (Dei notitiam hominem mentibus naturaliter inditam). This logically entails that Calvin regards the sensus divinitatis as a source of knowledge of God (notitia Dei). Moreover, this notitia Dei cannot be the same knowledge of God that Calvin introduced in chapter 2 because that knowledge of God required piety that Calvin concedes does not necessarily accompany the notitia Dei implanted in all (see Institutes 1.3.1).

(ii) Calvin describes these beliefs as a certain [i.e., particular] understanding of God's majesty. This could just as well have been translated, as it sometimes is, a "knowledge" of God majesty, a knowledge that Calvin says God "renews in memory" (an ongoing process). Nothing is said about regeneration or divine grace as a prerequisite here.

(iii) Calvin contrasts these beliefs with ignorance. By virtue of the sensus divinitatis he claims that no one is ignorant concerning there being one God who is our maker. If ignorance means "not knowing" or "lacking knowledge" (as it appears to), then by implication Calvin is referring to these beliefs of unregenerate people as knowledge.

(iv) In the discussion of the sensus divinitatis (1.3.3) Calvin notes that some try hard to rid themselves of this conviction that there is some God, thereby anticipating the discussion of the noetic effects of sin in chapter four. Note how Calvin describes this: "For the world. . .tries as far as it is able to cast away all knowledge of God, and by every means to corrupt the worship of him. . .yet the sense of divinity, which they greatly wished to extinguish, thrives and presently burgeons" (1.3.3). Calvin then refers to this as "knowledge of God" that is "unstable and fleeting" (1.3.3).

Beversluis mentions Calvin's awareness of Paul's statement in Romans: "the invisible things of God from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made" (Romans 1:20). But the suppressing of the truth in unrighteousness that Paul develops certainly seems to presuppose that what God has revealed "is understood."

Calvin comments:

In his Commentary Upon the Acts of the Apostles, Calvin relates the account of Paul and Barnabas who offered arguments for the providential care of God since "they take this principle, that in the order of nature there is a certain and evident manifestation of God."⁸ Calvin does not disapprove. Presumably Beversluis would, for if this order in nature is seen only by faith, the Apostle was acting foolishly. Moreover, it is this "evident manifestation" which forms the basis of Paul's apologetic at Mars Hill. According to Calvin, Paul "showeth by natural arguments who and what God is,"⁹ and since "he hath to deal with profane men, he draweth proofs from nature itself; for in vain should he have cited testimonies of Scripture."¹⁰ Now although Calvin is careful to note in this context that there is a "true knowledge of God" which is a gift and comes by faith, this is carefully distinguished from a "general knowledge of God"¹¹ which remains in fallen humans. Calvin says that by nature fallen humans are imbued with some sense of God: "aliquo Dei sensu imbuti sunt". Although unregenerate people entertain wrong ideas about God, or in some cases even deny his existence, Calvin insists that there is a natural knowledge of God in fallen humans.

In his commentaries on both Romans and Acts Calvin says that the natural knowledge is "insufficient." But Calvin is clear about the nature of this "insufficiency." For one, it is only a knowledge of God as Creator, not as Redeemer. Secondly, since without grace fallen humans have confused ideas of God, Scripture helps us to understand properly who and what God is, thereby disabusing us of false notions about the Creator. Most importantly, man's natural knowledge is not salvific. It does not include a love of and obedience to God. What Calvin calls a "true", "clear", or "pure" knowledge of God is both affective and effective. Man’s natural (propositional) knowledge of God is not.¹²

Calvin's position in the commentaries is consistent with what he says in the Institutes. We have already seen that in the Institutes Calvin distinguishes between a "pure and clear knowledge" of God (which has reference to both a right conception of what God is and affective knowledge) and "perceptions" or "convictions" that "there is some God" (1.3.3) or "some conception of God" (1.3.2) and that "he is their Maker" (1.3.1). When Calvin refers to the "primal and simple knowledge to which the very order of nature would have led us if Adam had remained upright" (1.2.1), he is referring to knowledge in the former sense. This knowledge certainly includes a propositional component. Calvin says that even the few who deny that God exists, "from time to time feel an inkling of what they desire not to believe" (1.3.2). Calvin seems to think of knowledge of God’s existence in this sense as something like a "bare" knowledge of God, which carries with it some notion of God's nature. This is clearly propositional knowledge, as opposed to the more affective or experiential knowledge that is Calvin's main interest. Again, there is a delicate distinction between "knowledge of God" in senses (2) and (3) formulated earlier.

The failure of this "bare" knowledge is partly epistemic: people sometimes have false beliefs about God, but Calvin is careful not to assert that no one has any true beliefs about God). Having some propositional knowledge of God is consistent with lacking a good deal of such knowledge of God. More importantly, the bare knowledge does not affect fallen humans as it ought. We are not moved to love and worship God. Beversluis has correctly located this failure of natural knowledge. But Calvin most certainly does not deny that the sensus divinitatis is functional in fallen humans so that it produces no true theistic beliefs.¹³ The "propositional knowledge" of formulation (3) above still remains. This knowledge at least includes propositions of the form "there is some God," "God is one," "God is powerful," and "God is Creator of the world." In this sense, according to Calvin, fallen humans can and do have a natural knowledge of God.¹⁴

But doesn’t' Calvin deny even a natural propositional knowledge of God as the possession of unregenerate persons in other passages?

What are we to make of this?

First, Calvin refers in this passage to a knowledge "of the true God." Taken at face value, then, the passage seems to imply that only knowledge of the true God is knowledge of God. Unfortunately that contradicts many things that Calvin says in the Institutes, as I quoted above. There he distinguishes between the knowledge of God implanted in all by nature and the knowledge of the true God, but both are called knowledge. What makes this more interesting is that Calvin here apparently takes the transience of the pagan's belief to entail that he does not have knowledge, but in the Institutes (1.3.3) he spoke of a knowledge of God that is "unstable" and "fleeting." He can't have it both ways of course, the instability and fleeting character of the pagan's belief is either logically inconsistent with (propositional) knowledge or it isn't.

One way of harmonizing this is to recognize that Calvin here is speaking of knowledge as what in the Institutes (1.2.1) he calls knowledge "properly speaking." However, Calvin's definition of knowledge "properly speaking" is not merely propositional knowledge. It ties into his rather intricate notion of a primal and simple knowledge of God that includes piety, what I referred to under (2) above. I have already agreed that in this sense of knowledge "properly speaking" the pagan does not have knowledge of God. Another possibility is that Calvin is thinking of the specific proposition that God made the world, where this means creation ex nihilo, in which case the pagans did not have propositional knowledge of that proposition, but perhaps only of a less precise sort of proposition. Given the widespread belief in an eternal cosmos in pagan religion and philosophy, this would be a significant point. In fact, even Aquinas said that only by divine revelation could one know that God created ex nihilo and that time had a beginning. Whether Aquinas and Calvin, if he means this, is correct, is of course another matter.

So, overall, this is an interesting passage just because Calvin seems to distinguish between true beliefs and knowledge, but given the range of meaning attributed to "knowledge of God" in Calvin, the passage is far from conclusive evidence against the claim about minimal propositional knowledge possessed by the pagan.

Beversluis rightly points out that for Calvin natural revelation has a post-lapsarian function: leaving humans "without excuse" for their sins before God (RRO, p. 195). The original edition of the Institutues, being modeled on Luther's Catechism, introduced the topic of "knowledge of God" in the context of an exposition of the law of God, thereby placing Calvin's epistemological discussion in a distinct moral and religious context. But what exactly is the connection between the implicit epistemological claims and the explicit issue of moral and/or religious accountability before God? It has been argued that fallen humans are responsible before God because there is an objectively clear revelation of God in the created order, but men fail to see this revelation of God as creator because, as fallen, they are noetically blind. Moreover, though our noetic blindness is a consequence of our fallen nature, we are nonetheless responsible for our fallen nature and so responsible before God. This model would seem to provide Beversluis with a way of maintaining the post-lapsarian relevance of natural revelation without affirming any post-lapsarian natural knowledge.¹⁵

Beversluis might find some support for this claim as others have in the Institutes (1.5.14-15). In these chapters Calvin seems to base human accountability on the fact that God's revelation in creation is objectively clear and humans are blind to it because they have willingly chosen to smother the natural light God has given them. The manifestation of God in creation renders men inexcusable (1.5.14) and we are prevented from acquiring by natural ability a pure and clear knowledge of God, but "all excuse is cut off because the fault of dullness is within us" (1.5.15). Yet though elsewhere Calvin grounds the noetic effects of sin in the transmission of a sinful nature inherited from Adam (so that we are all born with noetic defects of some sort), Calvin here emphasizes noetic corruption as caused by acts of personal sin. Notice, though, that the natural revelation in creation strikes "some sparks" but "their fuller light" is what is smothered by perverted human will. Consequently, we are not led on "the right path." Calvin is concerned with the willful corruption of the "seed of the knowledge of God" so that it fails to bear "proper fruit." The discussion of the (inherited and acquired) noetic effects of sin in the Institutes is compatible with some bare knowledge of God.

This conclusion is further substantiated by Calvin's exposition of Romans 1:18-23, which inspired and forms the background to the discussion in the Institutes. In his 1540 Commentary on Romans Calvin explicitly asserts that it is the knowledge of God possessed by fallen human persons that renders them inexcusable.¹⁶ After affirming the majesty of God set forth in the created order, Calvin makes three claims: (i) the evidence of God's existence in creation is sufficiently clear in itself, (ii) it is rendered obscure [not eradicated] by human blindness, and (iii) human blindness does not preclude our having some knowledge of God in our fallen state. Calvin writes: "We are not so blind that we can plead our ignorance as an excuse for our perverseness. We conceive that there is a Deity; and then we conclude, that whoever he may be, he ought to be worshipped. . . .but this knowledge which avails only to take away excuse, differs greatly from that which brings salvation. . . ."¹⁷ Calvin's interest here is to affirm some post-lapsarian knowledge of God as a basis for accountability to God, while at the same time denying the completeness or purity of this knowledge, for he says that it is only by the light of Scripture and faith that we can obtain the knowledge of "who or what sort of being God is."

Calvin apparently has a complex theory of moral and religious accountability. There are both positive and negative grounds of inexcusability. We are born with original sin derived from Adam, and this entails inherited noetic effects of sin. In this context we are without excuse when we fail to worship God because, despite the inherited noetic effects of sin, we know at least this much: there is a Creator God and He ought to be worshipped.¹⁸ But there are also acquired noetic effects of sin, and as a consequence we are also without excuse if we lack a clear knowledge of God, because we willingly corrupt our natural knowledge of God. Having said this I hasten to add that the presence of some natural knowledge of God in fallen, unregenerate people is compatible with their not acknowledging the existence of God or their claiming not to believe or know that God exists. Self-deception may be regarded as another noetic effect of sin. Calvin certainly holds that humans rebel against the light that God has offered them in nature. But this rebellion, this suppressing of truth in unrighteousness, and corruption of the clear knowledge of God are all compatible with a set of true beliefs and stock of natural knowledge of God. People may know that God exists, even if they choose to live their life without reference to him. Beversluis comes close to seeing this point when he says that all people believe in God but not all acknowledge their beliefs. What Beversluis should have argued is that, though there are natural theistic beliefs produced by a functioning sensus divinitatis, we must recognize that this faculty (or related ones) is subject to various malfunctions that entail the production of a mixture of true and false theistic beliefs, as well as a refusal to acknowledge one's theistic beliefs.¹⁹ But this way of looking at matters is entirely compatible with what Plantinga says about the sensus divinitatis. Plantinga’s examples of properly basic theistic beliefs are a legitimate elaboration of the propositional content Calvin thinks is epistemically accessible for fallen humans by natural reason alone, even though such knowledge is not what Calvin thinks of as a "true" or "pure" knowledge of God.

In this last section I want to elaborate on the noetic effects of sin in relation to natural knowledge of God. I'll also suggest an epistemological framework that will do justice to both the idea of natural knowledge of God and obstacles to this knowledge as a result of sin.

In chapter 4 Calvin begins by saying: "Besides while some may evaporate in their own superstitions and others deliberately and wickedly desert God, yet all degenerate from the true knowledge of God. And so it happens that no real piety remains in the world." (1.4.1)

Note first that Calvin speaks of all degenerating from the "true knowledge of God," a phrase that I believe rightly refers back to the primal and simple knowledge of God as Creator which all would have retained if Adam remained upright. This is confirmed not only by his previous counterfactual statement, but by the connection of each with piety (as a necessary component of knowledge of God in that original sense). "And so it happens that there is no real piety in the world." But in chapter three it was clear that the sensus divinitatis does function even where this is no piety. Also, Calvin says, "this confused knowledge of God differs from the piety from which religion takes its source" (1.4.4).

Secondly, Calvin says that even under the most perverse of corruption pagans "are compelled to recognize some God" (1.4.2) and that though God's glory is often stifled or extinguished by wickedness, "Yet that seed remains which can in no wise be uprooted: that there is some sort of divinity" (1.4.4). Calvin even acknowledges "limited" cases (hence not applicable to all unregenerate people) where there is a denial of God. But he says that (i) this is the result of their own sins by which they cast God off from their remembrance and (ii) even where it involves a denial of God, it is only as a denial of his presence and providential control not his existence (1.4.2).

In chapter four it seem rather clear that Calvin is locating the production of many false beliefs about God (as well as the false worship of God, false religions) in the corruption of the sensus divinitatis. But he never says that the sensus divinitatis never produces the knowledge that it was intended to produce, which was by the testimony in chapter three, which is quite limited in the first place. Moreover, Calvin seems to maintain a very dynamic interplay between the proper and improper deliverances of the sensus divinitatis. Despite the perversion of this natural knowledge of God, which results in much gross ignorance, man is not totally ignorant. "From this it is clear that they have not been utterly ignorant of God" (1.4.4.).

In chapter five Calvin extends his account of the knowledge of God as related to the sensus divinitatis to include a self-revelation in the created order. Unlike his account of the sensus divinitatis, Calvin develops several divine attributes in relation to this external witness: God's power, goodness, and wisdom (1.5.3). But is any of this recognized by the unregenerate? He does say that, despite "ungratefulness" and "pride", "they are compelled to know - whether they will or not - that these are the signs of divinity" (1.5.4). In referring to the testimony God has given of himself in the created order Calvin says: "Sometimes we are driven by the leading and direction of these things to contemplate God; this of necessity happens to all men. Yet after we rashly grasp a conception of some sort of divinity we fall back into the ravings or evil impurities of our flesh, and corrupt by our vanity the pure truth of God." (1.5.11). Calvin certainly seems to limit the extent to which the unregenerate can read off the creation the divine attributes he states. As noted with reference to Romans 1:19 earlier, Calvin says that this "does not signify such a manifestation as men's discernment can comprehend; but, rather shows it to not go further than to render them inexcusable (1.5.14).

Calvin then states that "we lack the natural ability to mount up unto the pure and clear knowledge of God" (1.5.15). But if this is intended to be Calvin principle of some limit to the unregenerate's knowledge, it leads us back to the proper sense of a knowledge of God in chapter two. For there he identified clarity and purity of knowledge of God with something other than mere propositional knowledge. Later in the Institutes he says that there are "competent and apt statements about God here and there in the philosophers" (2.2.18) and "droplets of truth" (2.2.18). But he criticizes them for never sensing "that assurance of God's benevolence toward us (without which man's understanding can only be filled with boundless confusion)." (2.2.18). Again he writes that "Human reason, therefore, neither approaches nor strives toward nor even takes a straight aim at this truth: "to understand who the true God is and what sort of God he wishes to be toward us" (2.2.18). Calvin had earlier contrasted this knowledge with "that knowledge which, content with empty speculation, merely fits in the brain" (1.5.9). A similar statement is found in Calvin's commentary on Ephesians 3:12 where he contrasts faith with "a bare and confused knowledge of God."

This suggests two important points. Calvin's primary concern in denying "knowledge" to the unregenerate was a denial of knowledge in some sense other than propositional knowledge. Secondly, these quotes, as several earlier ones, make it clear that Calvin regarded another sense of knowledge of God to be the possession of unregenerate men, to varying degrees in different people. There is a bare, confused, unstable, and fleeting knowledge of God, but this is by definition still a knowledge of God in Calvin's mind, just not a pure and clear knowledge of the true God. The propositional knowledge of God that Calvin did think significant, and which he did not think was the product of human reasoning, consists of the truths of God as redeemer revealed in Scripture.

I think we can utilize Plantinga's externalist epistemology to make plenty of sense out of what Calvin says about the noetic effects of sin on man's propositional knowledge of God. In fact, I think Plantinga's epistemology provides a way of understanding how it is that true beliefs about God can constitute knowledge. I said earlier that Calvin isn't an epistemologist and so he doesn't exactly say how it is that these true beliefs of the unregenerate could constitute knowledge. He simply doesn't spell out the difference between true belief and knowledge. Plantinga's model could be adopted to give Calvin's account some philosophical flesh.

Remember that on Plantinga's epistemological model our beliefs constitute knowledge just if they are true and have warrant (to a sufficiently high degree). Our beliefs have warrant just if they are produced by truth-aimed cognitive faculties functioning properly in the appropriate environment, i.e., the environment(s) for which they were designed. Given the truth of theism, Plantinga thinks it is likely that we have been designed to form theistic belief, and to do so in a basic way. In a broad range of experential circumstances, if our relevant cognitive faculties are functioning properly, then we will form firm theistic beliefs. For Plantinga, the sensus divinitatis (hereafter SD) designates the relevant cognitive faculty that produces theistic beliefs in the appropriate circumstances. In other words, the design plan involves a range of circumstance-(intended) belief responses. True theistic beliefs will constitute propositional knowledge of God if these beliefs are produced by truth-aimed cognitive faculties that are functioning properly in the environment(s) for which they were designed.

Why should we suppose, then, that unregenerate people who have true beliefs about God do not also have theistic knowledge? Well, perhaps they do not believe in God very firmly. The degree of warrant is proportional to the degree of belief, and the degree of warrant can make a difference between mere true belief and knowledge.²⁰ Why might theistic belief not be firmly held? Perhaps this is one form of cognitive malfunction (see below). Maybe Calvin was thinking of something like warrant and degree of belief correlation in his commentary on Hebrews 13:1. Defeaters for theistic belief (such as discussed in chapter 6) could also lower the degree of belief and thereby reduce the degree of warrant, leaving one with a true theistic belief that does not constitute knowledge. Such defeaters might even be the produced by cognitive malfunction, in either the SD or some other cognitive faculty.²¹

Besides considerations drawn from degree of belief, I suppose one of the following conditions would have to obtain. The true theistic belief is produced by either (i) something other than truth-aimed cognitive faculties or processes, (ii) truth-aimed but malfunctioning cognitive faculties, or (iii) truth-aimed cognitive faculties functioning properly in the wrong sort of environment. It seems like (iii) is ruled out since the environment in question is terrestrial and includes the external witness of God. The environment has the same physical properties and theistic belief triggering circumstances in which humans were created to live. What about (i)? Well, given a theistic design plan, if people hold believe that there is a God, then that belief will be true. The natural thing to think is that the processes that were responsible for the production and sustenance of such beliefs involve faculties that were designed for that purpose, the purpose of producing true beliefs about God. Since it is reasonable to suppose that God created us to form true beliefs about him (certainly Calvin's assumption), the natural way to think of theistic beliefs is as the product of truth-aimed cognitive faculties. This also addresses (ii). It is possible that unregenerate people who form theistic beliefs do so as the result of another cognitive faculty that is malfunctioning, while the faculty designed for producing theistic belief is also malfunctioning or nonfunctional. Plantinga thinks this is unlikely, and I tend to agree, especially when the theistic beliefs are formed in response to the external witness of God in creation.²²

The account also provides a good framework for discussing the noetic effects of sin vis-à-vis the functioning of the sensus divinitatis. Such an account will explicate a range of malfunctions in the relevant circumstance-response pairs.

One sort of malfunction could be when we have the circumstance but no response from the SD module - what we can call doxastic flat lining. The most severe form of this would be the failure to form any theistic belief in any of the widely realized circumstances. Let's call this radical doxastic flat lining. But given that the cognitive design plan is divided into smaller mini-design plans (what Plantinga calls "snapshot" design plans) based on a person's age, level of mental maturation, social exposure, and education, flat lining might just be restricted to one or more snapshot design plans (but not all of them). Perhaps as a young child the SD-module was functioning according the specifications of the snapshot design plan then relevant. Later in life, though, the conditions specified for a new snapshot design plan (that of a mature adult) do not trigger theistic beliefs of any sort. This would be a sort of snapshot doxastic flat lining. Less severe flat lining could be flat lining relative to some circumstances, but not others. Suppose the design plan stipulates that under conditions like the sight of the starry night sky, adults should form the belief that God created all this, and that it also stipulates that adults should form a belief in God's presence and power during thunderstorms or something like that. The complexity of the SD might be such that a malfunction generates flat lining for some circumstance-response pairs, but not others for the same person. So there's also something like specific doxastic flat lining, according to which flat lining is restricted to certain circumstances and/or responses within a given snapshot design plan. (An analogy here may be taken from the hearing mechanism that permits a person to hear only some of the notes the mechanism was designed to hear, or the eye that cannot see certain colors.)

There may also be radical, snapshot, and specific doxastic malfunctions that are doxastic misfires, as opposed to flat lining. This would be the distinction between failing to form the appropriate belief and forming an inappropriate belief. Perhaps there is also something like doxastic blockage according to which the SD is functioning properly, but other (theistic relevant) cognitive modules are not functioning properly and override the proper functioning of the SD. In other words, the locus of the malfunction is in some other module and as a result the output of the SD is impeded. This would also be subject to similar variations as mentioned above. Lastly, there can be malfunctions that lead to less than firm theistic belief. Like the rest, we have here a range from radical to specific doxastic impotence.

So we have four general types of cognitive malfunctions relative to theistic belief: doxastic flat lining, misfires, impotence, and blockage (where the first three are malfunctions of the SD). Then there are the permutations of radical, snap shop, and specific flat lining. On Plantinga's model, how many of these would adversely affect a person's theistic knowledge? Potentially all of them, at least for a person at some time or another. But Calvin says that theistic knowledge is the (at least partial) basis of human accountability for fallen human persons who are, according to Plantinga, the very ones who are subject to the kinds of malfunctions I have suggested. Is there a potential problem here? I don't think so. It's just a matter of spelling things out a bit more.

Here are some possibilities.

First, some of these malfunctions would be consistent with a person's having theistic knowledge sufficient for accountability since some malfunctions do not necessarily preclude a person's having any theistic knowledge. Calvin, while recognizing that some theistic beliefs constitute knowledge, emphasizes how this knowledge is mixed with error. Technically, I suppose he means that, in addition to getting some things right, we get a lot wrong because of sin. The same can be said for specific flat lining. This could be consistent with some theistic knowledge, sufficient for human accountability. (Strength of conviction failures might also be consistent with theistic knowledge, though as already noted Plantinga does think that a relatively firm belief is necessary for knowledge.)

Those in the Reformed tradition would be inclined to stress noetic damage as something inherited as a result of original sin. In that case, we are all born with actual or at least dispositional noetic defects. We come into the world in a less than neutral, let alone optimal, epistemic situation. But Calvin, for all his talk about inherited depravity, lays stress on personally acquired blindness with respect our natural knowledge of God. Religious unbelief is not something we inherit as such, at least not in a way that is inconsistent with having sufficient theistic knowledge. Whatever inherited damage there is, Calvin thinks that the natural inclination, despite sin, is to believe that there is a God. It is the fallen human will that is responsible for suppressing and distorting the natural knowledge of God. Calvin writes: "the fact that men soon corrupt the seed of the knowledge of God sown in their minds out of the workmanship of nature. . .must be imputed to their own failing" (Institutes, 1.5.14).

Since a thesis of direct voluntary control over our beliefs is implausible, if any religious unbelief is traceable to personal volitional acts, then I suspect it will be in a rather circuitous route in which the former is mediated by the latter. Perhaps original sin leaves intact the disposition to form belief in God in widely realized experiential circumstances, but this disposition is interfered with in various ways which are traceable to a person’s volitional acts. Perhaps a person turns his attention away from the deliverances of the SD through diversion or atheistic literature that desensitizes the mind to the prompting of the SD. Or maybe habitual sinning helps cultivate (improper) affections which impede the SD. Calvin says that people "wantonly bring blindness upon themselves" when they "neglect sound investigation" (Institutes, 1.4.1). More importantly, indulgence in sin can adversely affect the prompting of the SD. We desensitize ourselves to God and sear our consciences by sinful habits or lifestyles. Stephen Charnock wrote: "loathsome actions impair and weaken the actual thoughts and considerations of Deity."²³ Similarly, Calvin speaks of those who "after they have become hardened in insolent and habitual sinning, furiously repel all remembrance of God" (Institutes, 1.4.2).

So, it is quite possible that those malfunctions that are inconsistent with theistic knowledge (e.g., radical or snapshot flat lining or impedance) are the result of malfunctions or impedance mediated by the human will. This may be the other side of the Romans chapter 1 coin. It may be that we are born in a less than optimal epistemic situation vis-a-vis theistic belief, but, though not optimal, it is sufficient to hold us accountable. Human persons individually make a bad epistemic situation worse.

Third, it may be that self-deception is a specific noetic effect of sin that is logically consistent with retaining theistic belief and knowledge, even if the person does not believe that he believes in God. Perhaps we need to expand the functioning of the SD to include acceptances as well as beliefs (if one accepts - no pun intended - that distinction). Then you would have a second class of malfunctions related to theistic acceptance, which no matter how severe would not negate theistic knowledge at some basic level sufficient for human responsibility.

In this chapter I have argued, against the Barthian tradition, that John Calvin does maintain that human persons possess a natural knowledge of God. I have explained the specific sense in which this is so. It is fundamentally a propositional knowledge of God as creator, and even this knowledge is mixed with error. Plantinga's religious epistemology provides a plausible way of understanding Calvin's model from a philosophical perspective. Such an account does justice not only to the level of natural knowledge necessary for human responsibility, but also can explain how sin plays a disruptive role in man's cognitive life.

But the immediate natural knowledge of God is not inferential. If there are any prospects for natural theology in Calvin, an inferential knowledge of God will be necessary. I want now to turn to the question of whether Calvin has any place for inferential knowledge of God, and what the prospects are for the project of natural theology given what Calvin does say about man's natural knowledge of God and the role of evidences for religious belief.