(Exam Questions and Answers, PART 1)

There is substantial evidence which supports the contention that John Calvin was influences by two prominent features of late medieval theology: voluntarism and the dialectic of the two powers of two powers of God (theological features of both the via moderna and Schola Augustiniana Moderna).

Voluntarism held that the ultimate grounds of merit (ratio meriti) of an act was not intrinsic moral value, but the will of God. Here the moral and meritorious realms are seen as discontinuous. This is should be contrasted with the intellectualist school (represented, e.g., in Thomas Aquinas), which held that there was a proportion or equity between the moral and meritorious value of an act. The ratio meriti was intrinsic to an act, determined by its moral worth ex natura rei. Voluntarism sought to ground the meritorious value of an act in the extrinsic dimension of God's will, specifically in his covenant with man, according to which the meritorious value of an act is a matter ex pacto divino. Duns Scotus applied this principle to the merits of Christ. he claimed that the Christ's merits and passion had no intrinsic value, but rather its meritorious value was conferred on it by God.

Calvin, in the 1559 edition of the Institutes of Christian Religion, similarly maintains that Christ's redemptive work had no intrinsic value, but that the ratio meriti Christi must be located in the divine will or determination to accept as such. Now, this discussion is absent until the 1559 edition of the Institutes, and its insertion in Book II.17.1-5 may be traced to Calvin's correspondence with Laelius Socinus in 1555. Socinus had asked how God could have been determined by the merits of Christ if redemption was solely a matter of God's free and sovereign decision. Is God is sovereign, there would appear to be no need of any intermediate (such as the merits of Christ). Moreover, if God is wholly free in his determination to redeem, he could not have been determined by any extrinsic intervention, not even the merits of Christ. Calvin responds by denying that God was determined by any such extrinsic elements in the scheme of redemption by basing that scheme in the heavenly decree itself--the divine will. Calvin, therefore, denies that the merits of Christ had any intrinsic value. God, Calvin asserts, is the determiner of the value of the redeemer's work: "Nam Christus nonnisi ex Dei beneplacito quidquam mereri potuit" (II.17.1). Christ could merit anything except by the good pleasure of God. Calvin thus aligns himself with the voluntarism of the via moderna and the Schola Augustiniana moderna. Specifically, he reflects the application of such voluntarism to the redemptive work of Christ, to Christ's merits in particular--a more clearly made earlier by the late Franciscan theologian Duns Scotus.

Secondly, though, Calvin is influences by what is known as the dialectic of the two powers of God--the distinction between the potentia Dei absoluta et potentia Dei ordinata (the absolute power of God and the ordained power of God). This distinction goes back to the late 11th and early 12th century and became prominent in the 13th century in relation to the Averroistic determinism at the University of Paris. Some theologians held that God acted out of necessity in his general determinations of creation and redemption. Although this safeguarded God's reliability, it seemed to many others to compromise the freedom of God. The dialectic of the two powers of God provided a framework according to which God, it could be argued, was both free and acted reliably. Prior to creating the world, God was faced--so to speak--with an set of possible worlds he could create (including various alternative schemes of redemption). The only constraint here was the law of non-contradiction. God's absolute power is his power relative to this set of initial possibilities. He was free to actualize any subset of these actualizeable possibilities. However, having chosen to actualize one particular subset, he has now bound himself by his own determination. God's ordained power is thus the divine power subject to the self-imposed constraints stemming from God's decision to create the present order. So God is free vis-a-vis potentia sua absoluta, but acts reliably potentia sua ordinata. The necessity by which God brings about things in the world is thus a conditional necessity (or a necessity of consequence): necessarily, if God wills X, then God will bring about that X is the case.

How, then, is this view present in Calvin?

First, at the most basic level, Calvin recognizes that there are many things God could have done but did not do. Hence, God's power extends beyond the scope of what he does in fact. Specifically, Calvin claims that God could have redeemed the world in some manner other than the way he does in fact. He says that the incarnation and redemptive of Christ was not absolutely necessary (invoking the terminology of the schoolmen by his own admission), but that it stemmed from an heavenly decree. So the universe de facto does not exhaust God's power, but Calvin certainly recognizes the reliably of God's promises and activity in the world. This certainly suggests the framework of the dialectic.

However, I would urge some degree of caution in the precise manner in which one attributes the dialectic to Calvin's thinking, and this for two reasons. First, Calvin himself explicitly disabuses himself of the distinction, regarding it as most inappropriate. Secondly, there is some degree of disagreement among scholars as to what--in its crucial details--has been understood by the potentia Dei absoluta, as well as to what extent God's absolute power is continuous among late medieval theologians. In the light of these considerations, I would urge the following.

First, it is important when assessing Calvin's dismissal of the absolute power of God as advocated by the "Schoolmen" that we understand what Calvin thought such "power" consisted in. Inasmuch as CAlvin dismissed the dialectic because he thought it separated God's will from his justice and wisdom, it would appear that Calvin thought of the potentia Dei absoluta to be the divine power as operating without any input from or constraints from the nature of God. According to Calvin, what God can do is delimited not only by the principles of logic (principally non-contradiction) but by aspects of God's own nature. He clearly understands the schoolmen to deny this. He characterizes their God as an arbitrary tyrant who acts according to a nuda potentia absoluta, naked or sheer absolute power. Now there is reason to think that Calvin correctly understands the absolute power of God as held by Scotus and Ockham, but the important point is that this is what he thought the Schoolmen were affirming. Therefore, his rejection must be confined to this conception of the absolute power of God.

Secondly, one may understand Calvin's view to in fact support a distinction between God;s absolute and ordained powers, if we modify his conception of potentia Dei absoluta to include constraints imposed by God's nature (a point raised by Heiko Oberman). Thus, although Calvin says many things quite Scotist or Ockamist in nature (e.g., "God's will is so much the highest rule of righteousness that whatever he wills, by the very fact that he wills it, must be considered righteous", III.23.3), he also stresses that God acts according to his wisdom, that there are reasons why God does what he does, but that humans simply lack epistemic access to them. Calvin denies that God's ways are unjust. He seems to want to maintain a conceptual distinction between what God wills and what is just or good. Now Calvin here seems to actually align himself to gregory of Rimini of the Schola Augustiniana moderna. It has been pointed out (by Gordon Leff) that Gregory's view of the dialectic different from Scotus and Ockham in one crucial point: Gregory held that aspects of God's nature functioned as constraints on God's absolute power. Gregory for instance quotes St. Anselm to the effect that "Although what God wills is just because he wills it, it doesn't follow that if he were to will what were unjust, it would therefore be just because he wills it." If this understanding of Gregory is correct, it suggests a connection between Calvin and the modern Augustinian school but a discontinuity between Calvin and the via moderna. At any rate, what is certain is that Calvin had a distinction between the dialectic of the two powers of God and hence may be seen to reflect an influence of medieval theology at this point.

The pervasiveness of voluntarism in 15th century theology is rooted in the 14th century emphasis on the freedom of God and the consequent contingency of the world. It may be viewed as the application of this 14th century emphasis to the scheme of redemption, specifically to the (causal) grounding of justification and human merit in the will of God.

Essential to the rise of voluntarism was the logico-critical tool of the dialectic of the two powers of God--the distinction between the potentia Dei absoluta and the potentia Dei ordinata (a distinction which may be traced back to the late 11th or early 12th century). The dialectic proved most useful in countering Averroistic determinism prominent at the University of Paris in the 13th century, for it allowed theologians to maintain both the total freedom of God and the reliability of God's actions. God's freedom is asserted vis-a-vis his potentia absoluta, and this potentia is explicated in terms of the freedom of God in creating the present order. God's act of bringing about the present created order may be viewed as the actualizing of a particular subset from an initial set of possibilities, possibilities delimited solely by the principle of non-contradiction. In more contemporary philosophical terms, where a "possible world" is defined as any maximal or complete, logically consistent state of affairs, God was free to create any such possible world, the actual one being the one he in fact chose to create. Hence there is a distinction between what is hypothetically possible (what God could have done) and what God de facto brings about. Being wholly unconstrained in the act of creation, God is free de potentia sua absoluta. Although the omnipotence of God is preserved by God's absolute power vis-a-vis the initial set of possibilities (he was not necessitated to create the present world), having so chosen to actualize a specific subset, God has now bound himself by his decretive will. De potentia sua ordinata, God is subject to self-imposed constraints. However, he can thus be seen as acting in a wholly reliable fashion. Necessarily, if God has willed to bring about X, God will bring about X, but he will not do so out of any absolute necessity. This is not to say that there are presently two courses of action open to God, much less that there are really two powers in God. It is only to stress that the ground of God's acting reliably in the present order is that he has chosen (freely) so to act.

But, as a consideration of Scotus, Ockham, and the theologians of the via moderna will show, the dialectic of the two powers of God had important implications for the understanding of human redemption. This is most perspicuous in the critique of the created habits of grace by theologians in the 14th and 15th centuries. The medieval understanding of justification was such that it was held to involve a change in the essential nature of man, a change effected by or involving the infusio gratiae (infusion of grace) into the soul. This so-called created habit of grace or charity was seen to be a necessary created intermediary in the processus iustificationis and essential to the soul's being acceptable to God. Duns Scotus, though, argued that despite de facto implication of such habits in justification, their being so implicated was not a consequence of the ontological status of the elements or entities involved; rather, they were implicated solely because God had so willed them to be. The created habit of grace as a created intermediary to bridge the gap between the state of sin and the state of grace was not absolutely necessary, that is, not necessary ex natura rei (from the nature of thing(s)). What Scotus, Ockham, and Gabriel Biel assert is the necessity ex pacto divino (from the divine covenant) of the created habits. Their necessity is relative, not absolute.

So whereas theologians of the 13th century took the infusio gratiae as logically prior to acceptatio divina (divine acceptation), the critique of the habits reversed this giving priority to the divine will and the acceptatio divina. This marked the transition between ontological causality and covenantal causality vis-v-vis the doctrine of justification. Consequently, there is found a striking difference between accounts of the formal cause of justification offered by advocates of covenantal causality. If the created habits are taken as necessary ex natura rei (as Peter Aureole and the early Franciscans held), then the formal or immediate cause of justification will be the intrinsic denomination of the infusio gratiae. But if the habits are taken as merely necessary ex pacto divino (as Scotus, Ockham, and the via moderna held), then the formal cause of justification will be the extrinsic denomination of divine acceptation. Scotus, in particular, argued this on the basis of the principle that God wills the end (acceptation and remission of sin) logically prior tot he means (infusio gratiae). In all cases, the emphasis on the divine will was essential to the development of covenantal causality, thereby deontologizing "grace", making it closer to an attitude or disposition of divine favor (rather than a substance as traditionally held), thus foreshadowing to a great extent the reformed theology of grace.

In addition to locating the formal cause of justification (ratio iustificationis) in the extrinsic denomination of divine acceptation, voluntarism may be seen to have special application to the formal principle of merit in the late medieval period. This voluntarism held that the ultimate grounds of merit (ratio meriti) was the will of God, not the intrinsic goodness of an action. The intellectualist tradition (represented, for instance, by St. Thomas Aquinas) held that the moral and meritorious realms are proportionate or continuous, that the moral and meritorious value of an act coincide. The voluntarism tradition (represented by Scotus and Biel) held that the moral and meritorious realms are not proportionate or continuous. The moral and meritorious value of an act need not coincide, for the latter is determined by the divine will. Here an important distinction is drawn between the inherent moral value of an act and its meritorious value which is an imposed value, imposed by God. So, for instance, according to via moderna soteriology, if a man faciens quod in se est (does what lies within him (to do)), this is a semi-merit, a meritum de congruo by which (God has ordained) he may receive the gift of justifying grace (infusio gratiae). Similarly, moral acts performed in a state of grace are meritorious de condigno by which a man receives remissio peccatorum. In each case, meritorious value (closely related to salvific value) is not a function of moral value, for in both instances meritorious value is grounded in the divine will. Under the terms of the pactum (covenant) God has determined to accept certain works as possessing a meritorious value sufficient for the infusio gratiae. Thus, the ratio meriti is located outside the sinner. It is located in the divine will.

Both the ration iustificationis and ratio meriti as articulated by many 14th and 15th century suggests that the general voluntarism expressed (at least implicitly) by the dialectic of the two powers of God had significant consequences for the understanding of the causal dimensions of the process of the salvation. Both the created habit of grace and the meritorious status of moral acts were made contingent on the will of God, thereby suggesting that the contingency of the present order extended to the present created order in its redemptive aspects, specifically to the present order and elements of the process of justification and the grounds of human merit.

Although some writers in the 19th century (Alexander Schweizer and Ferdinand Christian for instance) claimed that predestination was central in Calvin's theology, there is considerable evidence that this view is not an accurate representation of Calvin's theology. Contextual and methodological considerations suggest that predestination, though central in the period of Protestant Orthodoxy (1559-1622), was not central in Calvin.

First, it should be appreciated that predestination receives a quite bare treatment (not even as a separate doctrine) in the first edition of the Institutes of the Christian Religion (1536). Its first serious treatment is found in the second (Latin) edition (1539). It is quite likely that its treatment as a separate doctrine owes much to the influence of Martin Bucer's 1653 Commentary on Romans on Calvin's thought. Even here, though, is it treated in relation to divine providence and the general context of salvation. It is only in the final (Latin) edition of 1559 that predestination is given its fullest treatment, having been separated from providence (now treated under the doctrine of God in Book 1) for the first time, though still retaining its place under the general locus of the redemptive work of Christ in its application to human salvation.

However, it is precisely Calvin's treatment of the doctrine in the 1559 Institutes which when carefully considered brings doubt to the notion that the doctrine was central to his thought. It should be noted that Calvin does not introduce the doctrine until Book 3 of the (4 books of the) Institutes. Secondly, it is treated as the second to the last topic in book 3. He has already discussed (1) faith, (2) regeneration, (3) Christian life, and (4) justification before he discusses (5) predestination (followed by (6) the final resurrection. And then, it is only given four chapters (chapters 21-24). hence, Calvin treats the doctrine under the locus of soteriology (to employ some later terminology), not under the doctrine of God as was the practice in medieval theology. Moreover, it is not even the center piece of the doctrine of salvation. He has discussed most of the topics of redemption before coming to predestination. Prior to introducing it, Calvin discusses the diverse effects of gospel preaching. Why is it that some people respond to the gospel and accept it, while others continue in unbelief? It is this observable fact of experience that raises a question which leads Calvin into the teaching of predestination. Those who favorably respond only do so because God has chosen them in his sovereignty to obtain eternal life. They alone are the ones to whom the work of redemption is applied. Consequently, only they will accept the gospel claims. The rest God has been pleased to pass by in His sovereignty. They will not accept the gospel.

This, of course, raises methodological questions as well. Calvin's treatment of predestination (tied to redemption as it is) reveals Calvin's dependence on the doctrine as a teaching of Scripture, as opposed to speculation or philosophical reasoning, Calvin was aware that the doctrine could be treated that way, but he warns against it. He insists that we must only consider the doctrine as it has been revealed to us in the Scriptures. This knowledge alone he considers profitable. This certainly ties with Calvin's general view of the knowledge of God as being, not merely a speculative knowledge of God (his existence and nature) but a knowledge (a) of what is our benefit to know him, and (b) mixed with love, reverence for God. It is an existential knowledge--an affecting awareness of God's activity in the world and his benefits to human people. Calvin clearly displays his preference for knowledge of God as He is toward us, rather than as He is in Himself.

Now, to consider more precisely how the foregoing bears on the centrality of predestination in Calvin, we need to consider the role the doctrine played in the period shortly after the final Latin edition of the Institutes (1559). In this period, the so-called period of Protestant Orthodoxy, predestination was treated in a way (contextually and methodologically) distinct from what we have seen in Calvin. Theologians such as Theodore Beza (Calvin's successor at Geneva), Zacharias Ursinus, Jerome Zanchi, and Peter Martyr Vermigli now considered the doctrine of predestination under the doctrine of God--as did the medievals. So, it was now a matter of predestination vis-a-vis God's omnipotence and the divine decree, rather than the specific aspect of God's power de facto in relation to redemption. Some might suggest that Calvin himself anticipated this. After all, did not Calvin move providence from the locus of soteriology to theology proper, thereby harkening back to the medieval tradition. Quite so. Nevertheless, whatever might be speculated regrading what Calvin would have done had the Institutes seen further editions, it remains clear that the Calvinists had historical conditions which played an instrumental role in moving predestination into a place of prominence.

First, those who came after Calvin were influences substantially by the revival of Aristotelianism during the late Italian Renaissance, specifically this revival at its center--the University of Padua. Beza himself openly admits the influence of Pietro Pomponazzi who composed works on method as Aristotelian logic. In fact, one of the common themes in the Aristotelian Renaissance was the drive for a universalization of method and the attempt to articulate method in terms of Aristotelian syllogistic logic. Beza, as well as other Reformed theologians, were under the influence of this Aristotelianism. Moreover, they had good reason to apply it theology, specifically Reformed theology. These Protestant scholastics faced problems in polemics (intra-Christian debates) and apologetics (extra-Christian debates), which called for systematically deriving the doctrines of the Reformed Faith, which called for a system of theology which could be shown to be rationally coherent. The rise of Arminianism (the Remonstrance of 1610) put additional pressure on Reformed divines to consider "philosophically" their doctrines. So, for instance, the Canons of Dort (1618-19) established the so-called five points of Calvinism (total depravity, unconditional election, limited atonement, irresistible grace, and perseverance of the saints) in response to the Arminian challenge. More fundamentally, the focus on the divine will, the decretive shift, brought predestination into prominence as a teleological doctrine deducible from divine sovereignty (again harkening back to the medieval period). The importance of this historically should not be marginalized historically since predestination was the key doctrine that differentiated Calvinists and Lutherans. This was crucial in Germany where Calvinists and Lutherans (and Catholics) were in close geographical proximity. The need to identify themselves provided additional attraction to a method which would serve to highlight doctrines which differentiated Calvinists, not only from Catholics, but from Lutherans as well.

Whereas Calvin's treatment was a posteriori, analytic, and soteriocentric, the Calvinists (adopting a form of neo-Scholasticism) treated predestination in an a priori, synthetic, theocentric fashion. Calvin's method is largely inductive--reflecting the data of experience read in the light of Scripture. Calvin's doctrine of predestination is biblical in nature. The Protestant Scholastics approached predestination in a largely deductive manner--deducing it from the divine attribute of absolute sovereignty. Their treatment was philosophical in nature, with biblical texts often serving as confirmations of conclusions reached within a rigorously logical system of theology. Whereas Calvin systematically arranged his doctrines, they systematically derived them. The consequence of all this for predestination should now be evident. Calvin's method did not place predestination into a position of prominence--it was another aspect of divine grace in Christ. The Protestant Scholastics employed a method which brought predestination into a place of prominence--to the head of theology, as the basis for the many other Reformed doctrines.

The doctrine of predestination only receives its fullest treatment in Calvin's Institutes of the Christian Religion, 1559 edition (the final Latin edition). In the 1536 edition, it is not treated as a separate doctrine at all. Influenced by Martin Bucer's 1536 Commentary on Romans, Calvin begins to treat predestination as a separate doctrine in the 1539 edition of in conjunction with providence under the locus of human redemption. By the 1559 edition Calvin moved providence to Book 1 and retained predestination in its soteriological context, where it found its final place in book 3, chapters 21-24. The immediate context of the doctrine is that of the diverse effects of the gospel preaching. Calvin raises the question as to why it is that when the gospel is preached some respond favorably to it, while others retain no interest in Christ. Calvin adduces the doctrine of predestination to respond and answer this question.

Thus, Calvin sees human responses (or the lack of it) to the gospel to be a matter of God's sovereign predetermination to grant eternal life to some and to allocate others to eternal damnation. Human responses are the consequence of God's special antecedent initiative in the lives of people.

Now Calvin's commitment to divine sovereignty in human redemption is a theme well-grounded in the Augustinian tradition, and Calvin himself quotes St. Augustine at length. However, it is evident very early in Calvin's treatment of the doctrine (see above quotation) that Calvin's version goes beyond that of Augustine in respect to the scope of predestination and the logical rigor with which he applies the Augustinian doctrine. Augustine (as well as St. Thomas Aquinas) spoke explicitly only of a predestination "unto life" treating the negative element as God's merely "passing by others" who are left to perish in their sins--so-called reprobation. Calvin, though, does not seem content to think of a mere single doctrine of predestination, of some men as elected out of a massa perditionis, with others being permitted by God to perish in their sins. Calvin's doctrine is explicitly a doctrine of double predestination. There is--as it were--a special positive decree of God to consign some people to eternal damnation. Here Calvin reveals an affinity to the views on predestination in the Schola Augustiniana Moderna, and specifically the theological views of this school's central figure, Gregory of Rimini. Rimini (as well as Hugolino of Orvieto, not to mention Thomas Bradwardine) held that eternal life and eternal death are allocated to men ultimately irrespective of their merits or demerits.

The position is closely linked to the voluntarism of late medieval theologians (such as Duns Scotus) for whom the will of God is wholly undetermined by things external to Him. God is free. Consequently, election must be unconditional in nature. Calvin thinks that the logic of the position requires non-election to be unconditional in similar respects. Although Calvin does state that sin is taken into account in condemnation (as the proximate cause), (1) God's reasons for passing some by and predetermining them to hell is solely within himself and (2) God's reasons for decreeing the fall of man, whereby the human race is in a state of sin, are also within himself. Although later Calvinists will distinguish between two elements of reprobation (preterition: God's passing sinners by in his sovereignty and condemnation: God's punishing sinners by an act of punitive justice) Calvin's account tends to stress the absolute freedom of God on the side of both election and non-election (or reprobation). And he is fully aware that even if men are justly condemned for their sin, this sin may be traced to origins in Adam, and hence the question arises as to why Adam sinned. Calvin admits that, though he fell by his own fault, Adam fell by the ordination of God.

Now Calvin's tacit and often explicit assumptions regrading the freedom of God and hence the unconditional nature of predestination are crucial to his view on the relation between predestination and foreknowledge. Calvin explicitly distinguished between the two. By "foreknowledge" Calvin understands the simultaneous presence of all things, past and future (quoad nos), to the mind of God. In the language of "Boethian eternality" He speaks of God seeing everything (past and future) not as mere ideas but as actually placed before him which he views in an eternal present. This Calvin admits imposes no necessity upon human actions (contra the 18th century Calvinist Jonathan Edwards). He does make it clear, however, that God foreknows things only because he has determined what will take place. So, although God's foreknowledge considered in itself is not, strictly speaking, causative in nature (as some later calvinists would claim), what is known to God in the way of future contingents is a matter of his knowing future events which come to pass only because he has decreed that they should take place. This has led some to hold that for Calvin foreknowledge is based on predestination (rather than the converse).

Moreover, Calvin is quite aware that man of his contemporaries (such as Pighius) wanted to make predestination conditioned by foreseen actions (free actions) of men, such as foreseen faith or merits. Calvin stresses that there can be no cause outside God which determines the divine decree. God predestines neither on the grounds of what he foresees men will do in themselves or even on the grounds of what He will do in them. Hence, neither foreseen merit nor foreseen grace (given by God) is the ground of election to life. And it is highly probable that the freedom of God thus conceived leads Calvin to double predestination. If non-election is strictly parallel, then both must be unconditionally. Consequently, God predestines to life or to death without reference to merits or demerits. The allowance of sin in the picture has been suggested by some (Beza, Zanchius, and Gomarus) to indicate supralapsarian--God predestines men considered as unfallen, out of the pure mass of mankind, so that the decree of election and reprobation logically precede the decree of the fall. In this scheme sin is a means (instrumental cause) to the one end of God's glory. In other terms, Calvin's double predestination may well be a solid basis for viewing his conception of the logical order of the divine decrees as supralapsarian in structure.

In need be pointed out, however, that Calvin warns against a philosophical treatment of predestination. He says that we must rest content with treating the doctrine only so far as it is treated in Scripture--in so far as it is a matter divinely revealed. Philip Melanchthon in his 1535 loci communes had argued that treating predestination is dangerous, and that the doctrine is useless and unprofitable. Calvin admits that a philosophical treatment is thus to be avoided, but inasmuch as predestination is a teaching given to us in the biblical text, it must be treated. But Calvin, following Scripture, treats the doctrine in the biblical context--the redemptive framework. (In the light of this, it is interesting that he articulates a double theory of predestination, as this is something more readily deducible from philosophical principles than the explicit statements of Scripture!) Calvin is eager, therefore, to face certain issues in polemics. He is, for instance, eager to show that the doctrine is consistent with all Scripture. This leads him to carefully considering and expounding certain passages that seem to teach things contrary to predestination.

At the same, though, showing the internal consistency of predestination with the biblical text does not lead him to defend the doctrine against philosophical objections. His conception of God's freedom and transcendence leads him to make several statements that have suggested to some (e.g., Francis Wendel) that Calvin is under a Scotist influence. Calvin says, "God's will is so much the highest rule of righteousness that whatever he wills, by the very fact that he wills it, must be considered righteous" (3.23.2). Therefore, if predestination seems unjust, so it seems. But God's justice is different than man's. Clearly, Calvin's point here is epistemic, not ontological in nature. He is not claiming as Scotus and Ockham seemed to have held that by God's absolute power God could act unjustly and it would be just, that justice (or goodness) is ultimately whatever God does and it is just (or good) for no other reason than God does it. Calvin sees the nature of God (his wisdom, goodness, and justice) functioning as constraints as to what God can do. God has reasons for everything he does, but simply does not have access to these reasons. Therefore, we must rest content with what God has told us about his ways. Predestination is something God has revealed to us. Therefore, it must accepted. We cannot judge the ways of God. Indeed, predestination is for Calvin another way of making a point prominent throughout the Institutes, namely true religion makes God great and man small.

In 1515 Luther had developed a view of justification (based on a new understanding of the righteousness of God) which was at once wholly anti-Pelagian and partly unAugustinian.

I. The Background: Luther and the Via Moderna Theology

Essential to Luther's eventual theological breakthrough was the early influence of via moderna theology on his thought, both in his studies at the University of Erfurt (1501-1505) and later at the University of Wittenberg. This influence, accentuated during the years 1508 through 1514, played a major role in shaping Luther's early theology of justification (1513-1515). Three main principles may be discerned in the via moderna theology. (1) God has established gratia a covenant between Himself and humanity which lays down the minimal preconditions for justification. (2) Facienti quod in se est Deus non denegat gratiam, to the one who does what lies within his power, God will not deny grace. That is, in a state of sin, a man may through his natural powers attain a kind of merit, a meritum de congruo (a semi-merit), and receive the infusion of the created habit of grace. (3) The iustitia Dei is a matter of God's rendering to each man his due: reddens unicuique quod suum est (Aristotelian-Ciceronian definition of justice), where this is in turn interpreted in terms of the pactum or covenant.

In Luther's Dictata super Psalterium (1513-15), the basic principles of the via moderna are present. Luther recognizes that God has established a pactum and testimonium which contains the conditions for justification. For Luther the minimal precondition for justification is humility or the humility of faith. Luther speaks of God giving grace to those who humble themselves, a statement running parallel to the via moderna slogan of God giving his grace to those who do what lies within them. Luther is explicit in his endorsement of the notion of covenantal causality according to which the meritorious value of faciens quod in se est is established by the divine will and on the terms of the covenant. Commenting on Matthew 7:7-8, Luther says:

So we find in Luther's early theology of justification the following points:

II. The Nature of Luther's Theological Breakthrough

In his Autobiographical Fragment of 1545 Luther ties his theological breakthrough to a new understanding of the iustitia Dei. Whereas he had previously understood by iustitia Dei the active righteousness by which God is righteous and punishes sinners, he comes to understand the phrase to mean "a passive righteousness by which the merciful God justifies sinners." Luther became increasingly disturbed by the classical conception of righteousness that meant "rendering to each man his due." Such a principle of iustitia could only be positive if man is capable of meeting the minimal precondition of justification. But is precisely what Luther comes to deny. Later in the Dictata super Psalterium and in the Commentary on Romans (1515-16), Luther expresses doubt about the natural abilities of man enabling him facere quod in se est. The doctrine of the servum arbitrium emerges toward the end of the Psalterium, the first indication of Luther's growing pessimism about the human will, a pessimism fully established by the time of the Romans Commentary.

In other terms, if Luther's theological breakthrough is to be located in a new understanding of the iustitia Dei, this suggests (entails) a denial of man's ability to meet the minimal precondition of justification. Only if man cannot obtain a meritum de congruo does it make sense to reject the classical conception of iustitia. The gospel is the good news of salvation, for in it the iustitia Dei stands revealed. If iustitia Dei is understood in moderni terms, then the gospel will be good news only if man can in fact meet the precondition. But if man cannot meet this condition, there simply can be no good news, for man will receive his due--condemnation. Luther's hatred of the moderni sense of iustitia can only be explained by his settled conviction that man cannot facere quod in se est.

In short:

Luther's theological breakthrough, then, involves a necessary break with via moderna theology.

But, at this point Luther's breakthrough is merely a revival of Augustinianism. Luther's distinctive contribution to justification by faith is to be found in his iustitia Christi aliena and the totus homo theology. This had two implications. If man is righteous, the whole man is righteous. Staupitz (following Augustine) argued that man is partly righteous and partly sinful. According to Luther, righteousness and sinfulness had to predicated of the whole person. So the Christian is simul iustus et peccator. Secondly, Luther understands iustitia (whereby man is iustus) to be something extrinsic to the believer, not just in origin (as Augustine would also claim) but in possession. Luther denominates this the alien righteousness of Christ, which like a garment clothes the Christian with justifying righteousness. Man may be extrinsically iustus coram Deo, but he is intrinsically peccator coram hominibus. Like a person under the care of a physician, the healing process is initiated by the doctor's care but gradually actualized in the patient. The Christian is thus spoken of as iustus in spe non in re. Central here, though, is Luther's extrinsicism. For Augustine, despite its external origin, righteousness is internal.

Hence, we may lay out the third main Lutheran principle:

Luther's theological breakthrough may be said to consist of the conjunction of (A)-(C).

III. The Date of the Breakthrough

But when did Luther begin to adopt the conjunction of (A)-(C), or at least any of (A)-(C)?

According to the Autobiographical Fragment (1545), 1519 is the date explicitly singled out as a date of significance vis-a-vis Luther's departure from the classical conception of iustitia. By deduction we can infer that there is a commitment to the servum arbitrium here as well. The text, however, is not clear whether 1519 is the date in which or by which Luther had changed his mind on the meaning of iustitia Dei. There is independent reason, though, to hold that Luther's discovery actually took place before 1519 and hence for maintaining that 1519 was the year by which he had broke with the via moderna and embraced a new conception of iustitia and justification.

Consider:

The evidence (1)-(5) makes it clear that at the time Luther embarked on the Roman's Commentary, he had already come to hold: (a) Man as passive in justification, (b) man's will as enslaved to sin, (c) facere quod in se est (and meritum de congruo) condemned as Pelagian, (d) a rejection of the classical conception of iustitia.

So 1515 seems to be the date of the year in which Luther had arrived at the basic principles of his theological breakthrough. On the basis of his Disputation against Scholastic Theology (1517) and the Galatians Commentary (1516-17), and the critical notes found in Luther's copy of Biel's works that 1519 could not have been the year in which Luther had made his breakthrough. All the essential propositions of the breakthrough were present Luther's writings at least two years prior. The problematic double pluperfect clause in the Autobiographical Fragment, captus fueram (I had been overcome) must be read as a digression from Luther's main thought, thereby marking a chronological discontinuity within an otherwise continuous narrative. Hence, 1519 is the year by which Luther's theology had undergone radical change. It was complete by, not in, 1519. This is also consistent with what Luther says at the end of the Autobiographical Fragment, namely that he made his discovery before he had read Augustine's On the Spirit and the Letter. But he read this work in 1515. Therefore, unless Luther is read to blatantly contradict himself in the Fragment, we must understand Luther to be telling us that by 1519 the theological breakthrough was complete, the initial insights going back to 1515 (at least) just before he read Augustine's work in that year.

In conclusion it should also be pointed out that the suggestion made by some (e.g., Vogelsang) that Luther's transition actually occurs as early as 1514 based cannot be substantiated as well as 1515. 1514 date is argued on the basis of a shift in language present in the Psalterium, especially Psalms 70 and 71. Luther apparently displays a new understanding of iustitia fidei as fides Christi--the latter being a divine gift. However, talk of iustitia fidei or fides Christi is completely compatible with a commitment to free will, for (a) humilitas is identified with fides and (b) iustitia fidei is what a man must possess if he is to be justified coram Deo under the terms of the covenant. Here iustitia Dei is God's faithfulness in justifying a person who humbles himself or believes. The iustitia fidei is a general gift via the pactum. There is still a precondition of justification (within the grasp of natural abilities). Very late in the Psalms we still find Luther committed to free will and via moderna theological framework. So Psalm 70 and 71 cannot indicate Luther's theological breakthrough in themselves, for that break--as we have seen--requires a denial of free will and a rejection of the classical conception of righteousness.

Hence, I conclude that the total evidence makes it probable that 1515 was the year in which Luther made his theological breakthrough, and though he refined it in the years after, the substance of a new understanding of iustitia and justification was already present--an understanding at once wholly anti-Pelagian and partly unAugustinian.

Sudduth, 1994